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Abstract 
 
With Europe and the EU facing a time of constant political changes and financial crisis in 
to the Eurozone, the rise of phenomena like Euroscepticism and Populism are more topical 
than ever. Through the use of populist rhetoric, Eurosceptic parties, such as the British UK 
Independence Party (UKIP), are gaining support across Europe and have proven their 
influence on the European political stage. Claiming to speak in the name of the ‘common’ 
people, UKIP’s leader Nigel Farage regards himself as their representative in a quest to 
defend democracy, the peoples’ and the British nation states’ interests against the 
‘dangerous’ supranational institution and political elite. Farage and UKIP argue against the 
regulations coming from ‘unelected bureaucrats’ in Brussels and proclaim their main 
political agenda, favouring the UK’s eventual withdrawal from the EU. The use of well-
chosen, cunning populist rhetoric along with the targeting of EU’s supranational 
institutions and Mr. Barroso and Mr. van Rompuy as ‘Bully-boys’ has proven successful 
for Farage and UKIP.  
An examination of speeches and interviews by Farage lays open his implemented populist 
rhetoric tools and sheds light on the main targets of his criticism, the EU’s institutions and 
the European political elite. The aim of this thesis is to meticulously single those out and 
interpret how and why he criticises them. By applying an encompassing quantitative as 
well as qualitative method of content analysis, twenty-nine of Farage’s speeches and 
interviews are scrutinised against the backdrop of populism, populist rhetoric and 
Euroscepticism. Through frequent simplifications of complex issues and a reoccurring lack 
of substantial arguments, however, his credibility occasionally happens to be negatively 
affected. Farage does not provide a fundamentally solid plan for the UK’s and UKIP’s 
future, in case of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU. 
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1. Introductory Chapter 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
If there were only one truth, you couldn’t paint a hundred canvases on the 
same theme. 
--Pablo Picasso, 1966	  
 
When applying this quote to the British politician Nigel Farage, one finds myriad 
ways of presenting ‘the political truth’. In terms of Europe, the European Union (EU) 
and all its attachments, the United Kingdom (UK) has frequently proved to be a rather 
‘gate-keeping’ state, seeking to retain its domestic political sphere as untouched from 
Brussels as possible. It can be argued that Britain’s fairly glorious role in the Second 
World War (WWII) is part of the reason for Eurosceptic tendencies (cf. Grant, 2008: 
2). By having the uncontested role of a postcolonial power even after the dissolution 
of their empire after 1945, the UK has retained its isolated island character. It is not in 
vain that, after its discussion to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 
1960s, their referendum on membership in 1975, Thatcher’s firm and adverse attitude 
about it in the 1980s and the domestic public debates about Maastricht in the 1990s, 
Britain has been labelled “an awkward partner in the European Community” (cf. 
Daddow, 2006: 66 and George, 1990: Title). The founding states of the EU, especially 
France and Germany, have always been regarded as the driving forces of European 
integration, whereas the UK is widely and well-known as Eurosceptic nation and its 
people as rather more inimical than in other countries (cf. Grant, 2008: 1). However, 
the contrary could be argued as more likely, where a Germany-France dominated 
Europe bears reason for the British dislike (cf. Grant, 2008: 7). A frequently criticised 
issue on EU level from the side of the British is the argument that the Council of 
Europe was initially founded to prevent exactly that, a Franco-German dominated 
Europe (cf. Nigel Farage, 2011: Video 2).  
 
Within the last five years since the crisis, topics like populism and Euroscepticism 
have been brought back on the European political table and ask for active public 
debate rather than being put on the backburner. Especially now in times of the Euro 
crisis, instability and occasional ‘upheavals’, the developments and movements within 
Europe in that respect are omnipresent and more topical than ever. Doubts about the 
European project are raised, nationalism and Eurosceptic voices are re-emerging, 
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calling for a ‘worthy’ end of this European construction and a regain of supremacy of 
the European nation states. Farage’s way of dealing with and discussing these issues 
in the European Parliament (EP) and with the news is highly controversial, partly 
amusing, but in any case attention-grapping. 
 
Farage can be seen not only as a representative, but also as the epitome of British 
Euroscepticism. He polarises his audience with provocative statements about an 
‘undemocratic’ EU and its ruling class, especially José Barroso and Herman van 
Rompuy, who are sitting ducks to his reproaches, since they have not been directly 
voted for by the European people. Farage serves as an interesting individual to 
examination, since he represents a sceptical antipole to Europhile politics, thus, can be 
seen as a stimulus within the EP. What came to my mind when listening to his 
speeches was a wondering how Farage manages to convince people with his populist 
tirades, who and what his main targets are and how he sells his arguments through, 
often impudent, remarks. Especially negative sentiments about the EU are seized by 
him and implemented into his string of Eurosceptic and populist arguments. So far, no 
examination of Farage’s interviews, speeches and rhetoric tools has been done, 
especially against the backdrop of Euroscepticism and populism. Resulting from these 
reflections, I have established the following research questions. 
 
Which populist rhetoric tools does he avail himself of in order to bring his 
Eurosceptic message across? Why is he using them? 
 
Who are (the people) and what are (the institutions) his main targets of 
Eurosceptic criticism? 
 
1.2. Outline 
 
Structure  
The paper starts off with a general introduction to the thesis, lay open the motivation 
and limitation of it, as well as presenting the ‘protagonist’, Nigel Farage. The choice 
of method, quantitative and qualitative content analysis, is explained and justified 
against the backdrop of the theoretical framework of populism, populist rhetoric and 
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Euroscepticism, which are presented in the following chapters. Furthermore, the 
encompassing analysis follows suit, before a concluding chapter rounds this thesis off.   
 
 
 
 
Limitation 
 
The phenomena of Euroscepticism and populism have been subject to numerous 
research projects and academic scrutiny. There are vast amounts of angles and 
perspectives from which they can be examined, offering highly intriguing approaches 
to the topics. Since it is impossible to shed sufficient light on the whole range of 
Euroscepticism and populism when looking at Farage’s speeches within this thesis, 
the relevant aspects of both are included only. The conspicuousness of his presence, 
his political speeches and his Eurosceptic standpoints offer a range of perspectives to 
be examined. A purely linguistic analysis of his language, his usage of words and 
concepts would be a highly intriguing topic in terms of Eurosceptic right-wing 
populism at work. Simultaneously, his qualities as a charismatic populist leader of the 
allegedly single-issue party UKIP would offer enough material to write another thesis 
as well. Lastly, looking at Farage and his standpoints from perspectives other than 
political science would be an interesting approach. Yet, I decided to examine a 
combination of his populist linguistic tools and an interpretation of his ‘verbal 
actions’ against his political enemies as the most suitable approach to answer my 
research questions. Herein, I shed light on his rhetoric tools and provide an 
interpretation of them and his messages only, as a unilateral means of communication. 
An examination about the impact of these tools on his audience, as a bilateral cause-
and-effect study would also be highly intriguing. Additionally, what could have been 
interesting to consider is an autobiographical book with the title “Fighting Bull”, 
which has been published by Farage, laying out his political life and the early stages 
of UKIP. It would have offered substantial insights into his strategies of 
‘constructing’ a populist message by taking his side of the story, as well as his 
background and his own depictions into account. He explains his reasoning for 
entering politics “as an extension of my own annoyance and resentment at having 
inherited freedoms infringed by power-crazed idiots spouting gibberish” (Farage, 
2010: Description: BD). However, for objectivity reasons, this thesis will not include 
it as a source.  
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Source Description 
The chosen videos are primary sources and were chosen according to their relevance 
to the topic of the thesis, Farage’s speeches in the EP and some of his interviews. It 
should be pointed out that it is ‘merely’ Farage’s verbal production, in form of 
speeches and interviews on textual level, which are being examined. The tone of his 
voice, his gestures, the surrounding and anything visual in these videos is not taken 
into consideration. The videos are from a time-span of about two years, 2010-2012, in 
order to achieve more recent and up-to-date results. The only exception is one video, 
dating from 2008, which was included for logical and argumentative reasons. The 
video-‘uploads’ are from official sources such as the EP or UKIP and are checked by 
them before their publication various times for representational reasons. Thus, the 
‘uploaders’ of these videos are reliable sources, since they publish original speeches 
of Farage given in the EP or sequences of interviews with various news-channels, 
such as Russia Today or Sky News. All twenty-nine videos are available from the 
aforementioned sources, but due to an improved sound quality, for reasons of 
additional replies from politicians/ interviewers and an encompassing context 
understanding, some versions are preferred from other ‘uploaders’. Consequently, 
they are all treated as primary sources. The length of all videos varies between two 
and twenty minutes.  
 
The secondary sources are mainly articles published in political journals and a few 
books dealing with the topics Euroscepticism and Populism laid open in the 
theoretical frameworks and were chosen according to their relevance. My intention 
here was to include the most well-known sources, the fairly recent ones and a decent 
variety of them.  
 
1.3. Who is Nigel Farage?  
 
Nigel Farage is a 46-year-old British politician, leader of the UKIP and a Member of 
the European Parliament (MEP) for the South East of England. He is a former 
member of the Tories, the British Conservative Party, which he left in 1992 after they 
had signed the Maastricht Treaty and then went on to co-found the UKIP in 
September 1993. Having not been overly politically successful on domestic soil, 
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Farage gained a seat in the EP Election in 1999, for which he got re-elected twice. 
Shortly after the EU Eastern enlargement in 2004 and also in 2009, just before the 
Treaty of Lisbon became effective later that year. Farage became the leader of the 
UKIP in September 2006, which fulminated in a great success for the party during the 
2009 EP Elections. UKIP could count the second highest share of votes for the 
European elections for themselves in Britain, ‘abandoning’ Gordon Brown’s Labour 
Party and Nick Clegg’s Liberal Democrats by outnumbering them by over 2 million 
votes (cf. Video 14, 2012). He stepped down as the party’s leader in late 2009 in order 
to pursue a career as a Member of Parliament (MP) in Westminster, only to re-emerge 
as their conspicuous head again in November 2010. Farage is also one of the twelve-
UKIP members in the EP and the co-president/ co-chair of the Eurosceptic group 
Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD Group), which was formed after the EP 
elections in 2009. Beside nine Italian Lega Nord representatives, ten of his fellow-
UKIP MEPs are also members, making them the largest political party in this group 
(cf. UKIP, 2012).  
 
With an adherence to populist right-wing politics, Farage has been described as “born 
to rant” and with a variety of verbal offences against several of his political enemies, 
he has found ways to be noticed (Farndale: 2010). Farage has created himself a 
notorious reputation for criticising European Council (EC) President Herman van 
Rompuys, carping about his ‘overly exaggerated’ salary as being more than U.S. 
president Obama’s and he pejoratively compared him to ‘a damp rag’ and a ‘low-class 
bank clerk’ (cf. Farndale 2010 and Video 3). Also, the EU Commission’s (ECM) 
President, José Barroso, has been subject to Farage’s rants quite a few times. 
Interestingly enough, however, he has been harshly criticised himself when it was 
revealed that “Farage {…} used EU allowances to finance his eurosceptic message” 
(Helm, 2009). This allowance had a worth of £2m of taxpayers’ money on top of his 
annual £64,000 MEP salary and he pumped it into the promotion of UKIP’s message 
that the UK should leave the EU (cf. Helm, 2009).  
 
According to his ‘humble self’, Farage is “a firm believer in Independence for the 
United Kingdom” and also “a proponent of free speech” for what he has faced 
“considerable hostilities from his political opponents for speaking out in favour of 
free and fair referendums on the transfer of power from elected politicians to the EU” 
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(Farage, 2012). He states that “they {Barroso and van Rompuy} are trying to deal 
with me but only in terms of rhetoric, but not in substance” (Video 25&26, 2012). 
Farage seeks to battle bureaucracy in Europe and raises doubts against the Brussels 
authority, “such people presume to grant us rights where we can manage perfectly 
well with innate freedoms” (Farage, 2010: BD). The British politician sees himself as 
“a fascinating and controversial character” and, in the political sphere, as “a fun-
loving iconoclast whose motto is to work hard and play harder” (Farage, 2010: BD). 
His speeches can be described as arousing attention, populist and highly 
straightforward, which not always follow the rules of diplomacy and respect. His 
audience ranges not only from the EP, to the ECM and other institutions, but also 
includes the electoral public, the media and the press.  
 
2. Methodology  
 
2.1. Content Analysis 
 
In order to gain understanding of the actual meaning and implementation of content 
analysis (CA) as a method for this thesis, it is advisable to accumulate and compare a 
wealth of definitions of it. Firstly mentioned in the 1940’s, this method has been 
termed according to the Webster dictionary as an “analysis of the manifest and latent 
content of a body of communicated material (as a book or film) through classification, 
tabulation, and evaluation of its key symbols and themes in order to ascertain its 
meaning and probably effect” (Webster dictionary in Krippendorff, 2004: xvii). 
Naturally, throughout the decades, various new media have emerged, expanding the 
means or body of communicated material, such as internet, or platforms like youtube, 
twitter etc., that can be subject to examination, but the application of the method 
remains the same or at least alike. Krippendorff rightly suggests that “the phrase ‘or 
other meaningful matter’ is included in parentheses to indicate that in content analysis 
works of art, images, maps, sounds, signs, symbols {…} as data- that is, may be 
considered as texts – provided they speak to someone about phenomena outside of 
what can be sensed or observed” (Krippendorff, 2004: 19). In this respect, the wider 
definition of CA is important as it states that all forms of media can be involved and 
taken into consideration when analysing their contents. Thus, the examination of 
uploaded youtube videos, including interviews and speeches in a verbal form is 
clearly a part of content analysis. According to Neuendorf,  
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Content analysis is a summarising, quantitative analysis of messages that relies 
on the scientific method (including attention to objectivity, intersubjectivity, 
{…} reliability, validity, generalisability, replicability, and hypothesis testing) 
and is not limited as to the types of variables that may be measured or the 
context in which the messages are created or presented. (2002: 10)  
 
Herewith, it is essential to emphasise the unlimited types of variables and contexts 
that can be chosen and submitted to examination within CA. CA is regarded as 
research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative portrayal of the 
content of communication (cf. Berelson, 1952: 18 in Neuendorf, 2002: 10). When 
taking this definition into account, it is inevitable to scrutinise the exact meanings of 
objective, systematic and quantitative descriptions when used in CA (speeches, videos 
and interviews) and emphasise why exactly it is so important. General rules of any 
research method include that “techniques are expected to be reliable” and “scientific 
research must also yield valid results” in order to withstand careful independent 
analysis (Krippendorff, 2004: 18). The stating of ‘objective’ and ‘systematic’ is 
subordinated to the dual requirements of replicability and validity that need to be 
ensured by following pre-determined and -established explicit rules that are equally 
applied to all subjects of examination (cf. Krippendorff, 2004: 19).   
 
Both, Berelson as well as Neuendorf describe CA to be a quantitative research 
method. However, a combination of both, quantitative analysis (QCA) and qualitative 
content analysis (QLCA), appears to be an adequate choice of method for this thesis, 
since it considers the overall picture in its entirety. The traditional QCA allows for 
classifying my primary sources by establishing specific categories that provide 
numerical results, whereas QLCA enables to go beyond linguistic approaches of 
“merely counting words or extracting objective content from texts to examine 
meanings” (Zhang&Wildemuth, 2009: 1). It offers me to conduct a content 
interpretation through a systematic categorisation process, which helps me identify 
certain themes or patterns (cf. Hsieh & Shannon, 2005: 1278). In this manner, QLCA 
serves as an expansion of the traditional QCA by incorporating the identification of 
categories as well as their interpretation according to significant themes (cf. 
Zhang&Wildemuth, 2009: 11). Thus, the choice of method eventuates in a 
combination of both.  
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The term scepticism itself means ‘doubting knowledge’ and the famous philosopher 
Montaigne “{…} believed that there is no general truth about which certainty is 
possible and concluded that we can claim certainty about nothing” (Toulmin, 1990: 
42). This means that his philosophy would deny universal truth in any field. 
Moreover, it aims at justifying scepticism as something natural and limitless, since 
even general facts, theories and policies cannot be treated as real. So a healthy amount 
of scepticism towards ‘facts’ is adequate when using CA as a method.  
  
It is important to acknowledge “the contribution that analysts make to what counts as 
content” (Krippendorff, 2004: 21). As a CA analyst, I should not only understand, but 
be aware of my own social conditioning that plays into the matter as well. It is 
inevitable to mention that certainly my background, education, perceptions and 
knowledge form a basis from which the interpretational analysis is done and 
influenced. This means that a certain amount of subjectivity cannot be avoided. Just 
as Krippendorff depicts in one chapter, “a problem-driven analysis derives from 
epistemic questions, from a desire to know something currently inaccessible” and the 
content analysts’ strong conviction that the strategic examination of potentially 
significant texts/videos could provide answers (Krippendorff, 2004: 342-343).  
 
Five different categories have been established according to which the videos are 
examined. This corresponds to the aforementioned definitions of QCA and serves as a 
solid basis for the following QLCA and the interpretation of the findings according to 
the predefined theoretical framework of Euroscepticism and Populism / populist tools.  
The categories are: 
1 Key words & their Repetitions 
2 Metaphors & Illustrations  
3 Colloquialisms & Offences  
4 Usage of Pronouns  
5 Patterns of Identification & Solidarity  
 
For the quantitative analysis, Farage’s tendency of using certain rhetorical tools in the 
analysed material, supports and justifies the choice of the aforementioned categories. 
Furthermore, the theoretical framework on populism shows all these categories to be 
typical or common for populist rhetoric. In all categories, a counting method was 
applied, whose results are presented in the first part of the analysis chapter. Exact 
numeral listing for every video can be found in the annex. 
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For the first category, I decided upon seven key words that Farage re-uses throughout 
both, speeches and interviews. Since Farage speaks in a highly vivid and figurative 
language, which has myriad effects, the second category of metaphors and 
illustrations has been chosen. This ‘tactics’ is described shortly and their effect is 
interpreted. Furthermore, his speeches and interviews are riddled with numerous 
colloquialisms and often even offences towards his political opponents, justifying the 
establishment of the third category. Additionally, his tremendous use of personal 
pronouns is remarkable and offers vast amounts of possible interpretation from 
various angles. Lastly, his frequent attempts to identify himself with and to show 
solidarity for ‘the common people’ of Europe are striking and fairly common for 
populist leaders. Thus, the fifth category was established and can be compared to the 
four attributes of populist reasoning, finding traces of a “victimisation and 
redemption” in which ‘the people’ are presented as the unjustly scapegoats bearing 
the consequences of the political elite’s false decisions (Lee, 2006: 363). This will be 
done in the second half of the first analysis chapter.  
 
2.2. The Opportunities and Limitations of CA 
 
There is a range of advantages and disadvantages when having to choose and apply a 
research method and finding the allegedly most suitable one can be a challenge.  
 
Opportunities 
One of the most important advantages is that it examines the information straight 
from the horse’s mouth and allows for quantitative as well as qualitative approaches. 
When analysing Farage’s speeches, this seems to be a suitable combination, since 
investigating the frequency of his usage of certain words and linguistic tools is as 
crucial as their later interpretation. Furthermore, through the opportunity of CA to 
create arbitrary categories, allows scrutinising a matter from various perspectives, in 
this case from a partly linguistic, partly political science one. The possibility to 
examine written or spoken interactions by means of interpretations also offers to 
include the usage of language. A mixture of a quantitative and qualitative CA, based 
on ‘hard facts’ over discourse analysis (DA) as a potential method of choice for this 
thesis, seems more adequate, since “discourse analysts do not view analysis in terms 
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of or as equivalent to categorization” and they are fairly sceptical towards a 
preliminary categorization of the source, without knowing if the use of this category 
is justified (cf. Palmquist, 1980; Wood & Kroger, 2000: 32; cf. Schegloff, 1993). The 
option of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) for this thesis was also considered as an 
option since it “aims to provide accounts of the production, internal structure, and 
overall organization of texts” by having an “overtly political agenda” and by bringing 
in highly critical dimensions (Kress, 1990). However, since aforementioned 
categories are deemed as crucial, this mixture of CA was chosen over that of CDA.  
 
Limitations 
The most obvious disadvantage is that it is immensely time-consuming to count 
myriad words in twenty-nine videos. When a relational analysis is done to achieve a 
higher level of interpretation, it is also prone to loose its exactness by attempting too 
freely to extract significant inferences from the source. Another risk of this method is 
to choose categories too subjectively. In other words, there is an existing ‘danger’ that 
the inferences drawn from Farage’s speeches are too liberally and slightly 
inaccurately done in the analysis. However, the awareness of these risks shall omit the 
chance of committing grave errors and the distortion of results.  	  	  
3. Theoretical Framework 	  	  
In order to establish a clear theoretical framework of populism, populist parties, right-
wing populism, its application and its rhetoric tools, a versatile range of definitions is 
given. Herewith, the main aim is to lay the first half of a fundamental theoretical 
foundation for the later following analysis of Farage’s speeches. The general populist 
and right-wing populist characteristics are outlined here and UKIP’s specific traits of 
them, for structural reasons will be examined within the Euroscepticism chapter.  
 
3.1. Populism – An Attempt to Define 
 
Populism in Western Europe is by no means a new phenomenon and has existed for 
as long as there has been politics. The term itself can be defined from different 
standpoints, which means that populism “has precise meanings in a number of 
specialist discourses, but attempts at a general theory have been problematic” 
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(Canovan, 1999: 3). Bearing this in mind, there is agreement on the fact that populism 
as a term “lacks consensus on core definitions and ideological characteristics” 
(Rydgren, 2007: 242). ‘General populism’ and its ideology embody the idea of 
objecting the remarkable gap between the ‘common people’ and ‘the elites’ and seek 
to prevent an increased class-divided society and the social, political and economic 
exclusion of particular marginalized ‘outsider groups’. Essentially, populism 
describes a political concept applied by ‘the common people’ or their political 
representatives that implements the population’s emotions, fears, and prejudices as a 
tool to pursue their own aims (cf. Bauer, 2011: 6). Thereby, political discussions, 
issues and problems are presented on a simplified, ‘down-to-earth’ platter making the 
complex relations seem not only ‘black & white’, but also surprisingly easy (cf. 
Bauer, 2011: 6f). Canovan describes populism as the following phenomenon: 
Populism, understood as an appeal to ‘the people’ against both the established 
structure of power and the dominant ideas and values, should not be dismissed 
as a pathological form of politics of no interest to the political theorist, for its 
democratic pretentions raise important issues (1999: 2). 
 
She warns of running the risk of merely dismissing populism as an anti-political, 
peripheral matter and indicates its strong democratic ambitions to put emphasis on 
contemporary political nuisances. Also, Laclau remarks that “populism is the royal 
road to understanding something about the ontological constitution of the political as 
such”, meaning that the comprehension of populism phenomenon leads to a better 
understanding of political operations per se (2005: 67). According to him, “the 
political operation par excellence is always going to be the construction of a 
‘people’”, so in a way all politics is populist to some extent, obviously, some more 
than others (2005: 153ff.). Mudde encapsulates his definition of populism in reference 
to the ‘people’ and its antagonistic ‘other’, which offers an interesting, but also 
limited insight: 
“Populism as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt 
elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale (general will) of the people.” (2004: 543) 
 
Moreover, The Social Science Dictionary has defined populism as a political 
movement that seeks the “redistribution of political power, economic dominance and 
cultural leadership {…} in favor of empowering ‘the common people’” because they 
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are described to lead a simpler and more honourable life which is founded on 
traditional values and customs (SSD, 2008). Correspondingly, Fenneman notes that 
“‘the common man is basically good and his opinions are always sound’” and M.H. 
Williams agrees with that by saying that the “populist strategy pays attention to the 
demands of the public because elites of government prove incapable of responding to 
them” (Fennema, 2005 cited in Williams, 2010: 115). Williams emphasises that 
“Fennema largely concurs, characterizing populism as a political strategy whereby the 
state and its governmental elites are considered ‘technically incompetent and morally 
corrupt’” (Williams, 2010: 115). Populists regard the policy-making as being done 
almost merely according to the ‘elitist theory of politics’ and strongly object it as 
being entirely illegitimate (cf. SSD; 2008). Additionally, Canovan states that a wide 
range of populists favour ’direct democracy’, which incorporates “political decision 
making by referendum and popular initiative” (1999: 2). Krouwel & Abts are linking 
political discontent with populism and argue that populism is not merely a response to 
decreasing political trust, but that populists mobilise, generate and generalise 
sentiments of political discontent (cf. 2007: 253).  
 
Lastly, an essential feature of populism and populist parties is the existence of a 
charismatic leader. Ideally, it is an individual with the abilities for a stringent 
leadership, with a capturing, charismatic ‘aura’, who personifies the interests of the 
nation and “embodies the popular will in his or her persona” (cf. Canovan, 1999: 5; 
Hellström, 2012: 9). According to Hellström, populism as style refers to the 
personalization of politics, an emphasis on charismatic leadership and also the 
medialization of mainstream politics (cf. 2012: 9). Another argument is that populism 
substitutes the trust that was formerly put in the system with now personal trust in the 
charismatic populist leader instead (cf. Offe, 1999: 3; cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 
253). Deiwiks states that “if political institutions like parties can be portrayed as 
impediments to direct, popular sovereignty, it is tempting to charismatic, populist 
leaders to try to exploit the purported gap between the ‘people’ and the mainstream 
political establishment” (2009: 5). Striking is the fact that it is often ‘only’ a single 
person who serves as a driving force of a populist movement, “due to the leader’s 
direct appeal to voters”, especially in right-wing populism (Deiwiks, 2009: 5). The 
leader’s clear positioning on the side of the ‘people’ and away from the ‘elites’ helps 
strengthening the ‘bonds’ between him and them, thus, avoiding to being perceived as 
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a “self-serving racket perpetuated by professional politicians” (Canovan, 1999: 6). 
One reason why populism is often labelled with a negative connotation is that 
complex political concerns such as (un-) employment, health or economic prosperity 
are not likely to have simple solutions and populists tend to oversimplify problems 
(cf. Deiwik, 2009: 5).  
 
3.1.1. Populist Parties 
 
The re-emergence of European populism can be regarded as a “symptom of problems 
as it is a problem itself” and may well be taken as an indicator to reflect the up-
coming negative sentiment on the contemporary European political stage (Jones, 
2007: 44). Various scholars have attempted to categorise and define European 
populist parties throughout the years, but naturally, there are no common categories 
that unconditionally apply to all parties (cf. Williams, 2010: 112). Undoubtedly, 
several populist parties across Europe share the aforementioned common features, 
characteristics and beliefs, regardless if left- or right-wing, however, one cannot 
possibly colour all of them with the same brush. Yet, Jones’s argues that his findings 
about populism reveal that “what European populists have in common is a rejection of 
the cartel-like power of entrenched political elites” (2007: 38). A party’s opposition to 
immigration has often been associated with a populist position since public 
apprehensions concerning immigration haven been prevalent on the Western 
European political stage and mainstream parties have not brought forward a satisfying 
solution (cf. Williams, 2010: 122). Claiming to speak in the name of democracy, 
populists and populist parties regard themselves as the only authentic carriers and 
representatives of democracy that bring forward ‘the real people’s’ interests, wishes 
and ideas – “their professed aim is to cash in democracy’s promise of power to the 
people” (Canovan, 1999: 2). Another clear description of populist parties contains the 
parties’ generally oppositional trait and their notion of themselves as stemming from 
its objection of mainstream governments as well as institutional players and highlights 
their ability to consequently modify their political stances on a regular basis (cf. 
Williams, 2010: 115). In this respect, an interesting discussion can be triggered by 
examining suitable examples, where a populist party, or parties, have amended their 
message, stance and agenda over time in order to preserve this oppositional character. 
Deriving from there, Williams gauges that “populism is reactionary and 
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instrumentalist in nature” and that it respectively and almost automatically adjusts to 
its current context (2010: 116). The populists in established democracies assert to be 
voicing the will of the “silent majority of ordinary people whose interests and 
opinions are regularly overridden by arrogant elites, corrupt politicians and strident 
minorities” and often ‘verbally assail’ them for their dominating position in 
governance (Canovan, 1999: 5). 
 
Noteworthy is the fact that the credibility of populist parties often impairs when in 
government, yet, maintain a decent position in minority governments – ‘power 
without responsibility’ (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 19). However, one might also take Jones’s 
suggestion into account that it is not parties, which are populist, but people and that 
European populism is rather opportunistic than ideological (cf. 2007, 37). Ideally, this 
refers not only to the typical populist-charismatic party leader embodying a ‘peacock 
presence’, but also to the versatility of populist parties to easily adjust to the current 
political circumstances rather than following ideological principals.   
 
3.1.2. Right-wing Populism 
 
When looking at right-wing populism and their political strategies more specifically, 
one notices that it upholds this ‘vertical elite dichotomy’, however, avails itself to an 
additional scope of actions. It can be described as ‘nourishing’ an almost 
antidemocratic ideology that derives its legitimisation on the basic principle of social 
inequalities due to racial and ethnical differences (cf. Boettcher, 2011: 2). Zaslove 
argues that right-wing populist parties (RWPPs) commonly assert that “they are 
saving democracy from the elite and corrupt politicians” and, thus, going from there, 
“attract voters who are disenchanted with the bureaucratic state, the welfare state, 
parliamentary democracy, and the catch-all political party” (2004: 64). On the 
horizontal level, right-wing populism facilitates the objection of certain marginalised 
groups in society, whereas radical right-wing populism is more extreme and enforces 
their exclusion (cf. Bauer, 2010: 9f). In terms of telling the difference, RWPPs can be 
easily differentiated from established parties as well as right-wing extremist parties by 
their essential assent of the existing system and, above all, right-wing populism 
proclaims its doubts about a coalescing Europe (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 19). RWPPs back 
up the slogan ‘Europe yes – EU no!’ and frequently use prevalent notions within the 
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population against a Europe that is allegedly dominated by the EU at the expense of 
one’s own national identity (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 19-20). RWPPs frequently avail 
themselves of arguments stating that “the integration project has been described as 
(and criticized for being) an elite project” and that it has actually become obvious in 
the past years that the gap between the citizens and EU governance is wider than 
expected and cannot be ignored (cf. Hooghe, 2003 in de Vreese, 2007: 281). They 
caution the ‘common people’ against a severe loss of national sovereignty to the 
supranational institutions in Brussels that are allegedly deprived of any form of 
vicinage to the citizens and democratic legitimisation (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 19-20). 
 
Amongst others, the opposed issues of both, radical and ‘mere’ right-wing populism, 
comprise immigration, foreign influences and values and supranational institutions, 
which endanger and threaten domestic politics. According to Williams, Farage’s 
UKIP party, for instance, has presented an agenda, which states to carry a nonracist 
and anti-immigrant message (cf. 2010: 113).  
 
On a European scale, RWPPs object the European supranational institutions and with 
them the ‘un-elected bureaucrats’ in Brussels, who are often seen as the ‘bogey-man’ 
that pose a threat to domestic politics and European nation states (cf. Boettcher, 2011: 
4). According to some ideas of right-wing populism, individualism should be 
neglected in favour of a collectively and ethnically homogenous community that 
flourishes under a totalitarian nation state (cf. Boettcher, 2011: 2 & cf. Bauer, 2010: 
5). With the EU opening its borders for free movement and welcoming increased 
mobility of labour forces, along with a promotion of the EU’s motto ‘United in 
Diversity’, right-wing populist parties sharply criticise this behaviour and monger the 
fear of the national masses respectively towards a loss of national traditions, 
indigenous culture and identity. Taking this into consideration, Betz brands these 
RWPPs as being indeed populist due to their “unscrupulous use and 
instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment” and 
additionally because of “their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior 
common sense” (1994: 3-4). The aims and ideas of RWPPs are based on the belief 
that the ‘genuine civil society’ has to unshackle itself from the bureaucratic state, the 
‘incursion’ of immigrants and the establishment of a multicultural society (cf. 
Zaslove, 2004: 64).  
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There is an observable tendency among people to identify themselves through a 
distinction from others, often implementing nationalistic, xenophobic or racist notions 
(cf. Dülffer, 2007). Both, left- and right-wing populists share the characteristic of 
offering easy solutions to highly complex problems through a simplification of the 
matter (cf. Dülffer: 2007). Moreover, what is further criticised by European RWPPs is 
the feared loss of national sovereignty and values. They sense a severe threat to their 
national and nation state interests from the interdependence of European countries 
through economically integrated markets and political integration through the EU 
institutions (cf. Jones, 2007: 43). Due to this tight interdependence, they fear, no EU 
country is invulnerable from eruptions emanating from the others (cf. Jones, 2007: 
43). 
 
3.2. Populism as Rhetorical Strategy 
 
Understanding populism as a rhetorical strategy is ideally done thematically instead of 
politically, i.e. depending on the context rather than the political positioning. 
Populism, often related to advanced left politics, is a strategy without a specific 
partisan affiliation, proving a argumentative basis for the whole political range, so it 
cannot merely be assigned to left-wing politics (cf. Jackson, 2011: 2). Hence, populist 
rhetoric is known by ‘the pattern of arguments’ rather than its political content, so it is 
regarded as an exemplary reply towards situations that are scarred by crisis (cf. 
Rohler, 1999: 316). Interestingly enough, Jackson gauges this proposal and states that 
“populist rhetorics use populist reasoning”, meaning that they tend to apply some of 
the abovementioned typical populist characteristics (2011: 3). According to Lee, there 
are four attributes of populist reasoning that Jackson describes: “Populist rhetoric  
1) invokes a virtuous people ‘portrayed as heroic defenders’ of time-
honored values (358);  
2) identifies this rhetorically constituted people against a rhetorically 
constituted enemy ‘hoarding power’ (359);  
3) further compounds the enemy rhetoric by claiming to work against a 
‘system’ (like government or the economy) once virtuous but now 
‘sullied’ (360); and  
4) expresses an ‘apocalyptic confrontation’ or a ‘mythic battle’ set in a 
political order on the verge of collapse (362).  
 
(Lee, 2006: 358-362 in Jackson, 2011: 2-3) 
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Applying these four strategies to a European, right-wing populist political context, 
can be called a “narrative of victimization and redemption” in which the ‘common’ 
people are presented as the unjustly scapegoats who are bearing the consequences of 
the political elite’s false decisions (Lee, 2006: 363). To sum up, these attributes of 
populist reasoning can be illustrated as demonising oppositional and antagonistic 
positions to their populist notions - anything bucking their political stances.  
 
However, Jackson also remarks that populism and populist rhetoric have lately been 
“articulating more a mood than a specific political ideology” (2011: 3). This 
phenomenon can be explained with the abovementioned argument of Williams that 
populist parties are reactionary and strongly tend to disagree with mainstream ones - 
thus, they trim their sails to the wind and adjust their ‘mood’ to the current political 
context respectively (cf. Williams, 2010: 116). While being applied and practiced, one 
needs to consider the option that “populist rhetoric merely enables while pretending to 
empower” populist parties and ‘common people’ (The Economist Blog, 2008). It also 
looms large that strategic news about politics presented in form of populist rhetoric 
might fuel the public’s distrust in politicians and cynicism about politics in general 
and eventuates in a decrease of civil involvement and electoral participation (cf. de 
Vreese, 2007: 274). When analysing content, it has been shown that “with a higher 
level of strategic news reporting, news media exposure contributed to cynicism, while 
in the context of less strategic reporting, news media exposure yielded to a decrease in 
political cynicism” (de Vreese, 2007: 278). Deriving from the assumption that a 
politician in fact pursues to evoke exactly this cynicism in a specified audience 
against political enemies (such as rival parties or, on a European scale, the EU and its 
elites), this ‘method’ of populist rhetoric might prove to be invaluable. Naturally, the 
successful effect of this applied method and strategic news framing on Eurocynicism 
depends on their pervasiveness and political sophistication, so that particularly 
politically less-sophisticated people are swayed by populist rhetoric (cf. de Vreese, 
2007: 274).  
 
These rhetorics embrace a style that distinguishes itself by a rather black and white 
language. It dramatises the prevalent political circumstances by making distinctions in 
an exaggerated form, such as us vs. them, winning and losing, good and bad and does 
so by emphasising its universal absoluteness (cf. de Vreese, 2007: 274). The often 
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used dramatisation of content and the repetition of phrases being used in populist 
rhetoric further sells ideas as being ultimate truths and should be taken into 
consideration during analysis (cf. Jones, 1999: 39).  
 
3.3. Euroscepticism and Its Many Faces 
 
The following chapters have the purpose of defining Euroscepticism and then 
narrowing it down to its relevant subgroups. An encompassing approach towards 
Euroscepticism is of great importance, so it is looked at from various perspectives and 
forms the second half of the theoretical framework of this thesis.  
 
3.3.1. General Euroscepticism 
 
The phenomenon of Euroscepticism is by no means a new one and it is not surprising 
to learn that “its origins lie in traditionally Euroscpetical Great Britain, where it 
entered into political and journalistic jargon in the middle of the 1980’s” (Hartleb, 
2011: 10). Generally, Eurosceptics criticise the EU as an endangerment of the nation 
state’s sovereignty and fear the substitution of their national laws by supranational 
ones. Its occurrence can be observed not only in the economic and political arena, but 
also in the cultural and environmental field, so Euroscepticism is a multilayered 
phenomenon. Euroscepticism respectively evolves out of a general, adverse attitude 
towards a neoliberal economic system, a supranational institution that weakens the 
scope of action of the individual nation states, the homogenisation of the European 
cultural diversity and the EU as a slowdown when it comes to the implementation of 
sustainable environmental reforms. Although the EU’s motto is “United in Diversity” 
and several policies aim at preserving the variety of cultures and traditions in Europe, 
Eurosceptics indicate a distinct loss of exactly this diversity and predict an inevitable 
homogenisation among the European cultures.  
 
During the late 1990’s, Taggart depicts the term Euroscepticism as expressing “the 
idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and 
unqualified opposition to the process of European integration”, ensuing from the side 
of Eurosceptic parties (1997: 4). In the last two decades, the term Euroscepticism has 
been typified as a ‘touchstone of dissent’ in Western European party systems by the 
Paul Taggart and de Vreese also confirms a rise in support for Eurosceptic parties 
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across Europe (cf. Taggart, 1998; cf. de Vreese, 2007: 271). Looking at the political 
European landscape, Euroscepticism has been found to mostly emerge from the 
fringes of party systems and from a variety of parties (cf. Taggart, 1997: 3). Leconte 
proposes that political Euroscepticism should be seen a fundamental objection or 
defiance against the establishment of a supranational institutional system, the 
following devolution of powers to these institutions beyond a certain amount of 
policies (single-market, competition policy) and the idea of unifying sovereignties (cf. 
2010: 50). Lubbers and Scheele argue that only few countries have offered referenda 
over the exact policies that should be settled on European level – so most likely the 
legitimization of the EU eventually stands or falls according to the number of support 
from the European populace regarding decision-making on a supranational scale (cf. 
2005: 225).   
 
In the field of politics, the movement of Euroscepticism has emerged and made an 
appearance in almost all European countries. Trenz & de Wilde are providing a 
working definition of “Euroscepticism as a discursive practice of political opposition 
to the EU-polity”, which criticises the competencies, the institutional and almost 
constitutional character of the EU polity (2009: 3-4). Political actors, who reactively 
object the validity of the EU polity and who reject any increase in their power and 
responsibility in the political sphere of influence, apply this discursive practice (cf. 
Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 4). Additionally, Euroscepticism can defy the ‘absolute’ 
integrity of political actors and institutions by impeaching the behaviour of European 
elites and even demanding their substitutions (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 5). 
Criticism of or conflicts with single politicians should by no means be regarded as 
polity contestation, yet, a critique of a complete political elite should be indeed, 
though (cf. Hurrelmann et al. 2009 in Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 5). With the help of 
Euroscepticism and populist rhetoric, political actors manage to seize events, for 
instance a referendum, as so-called ‘windows of hope’ to come to the fore with long-
known problems and their potential solutions (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 7).  
 
In order to secure the successful public attention, “mediatisation and dramatization 
need to be understood as an essential element of Euroscepticism” and the performer’s 
Eurosceptic narratives dramatically emphasise the ‘danger’ of specific European 
nuisances (Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 11). Applying the commonly tried and tested 
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strategies of Said’s 1978 book “Orientalism”, namely ‘the other’ and ‘us vs. them’, 
“these narratives are typically constructed around the distinction between enemy and 
foe, between true friends and false friends, between assumed perpetrators and real 
perpetrators that dramatize the stories, make them publicly salient and provoke 
societal resonance” (Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 11). Definitions also include a 
distinction between Euroscepticism as a general mood and as an element of a 
particular political and ideological presentation given by certain parties (Hartleb, 
2011: 7).  
 
Euroscepticism and Political Discontent 
Krouwel & Abts argue that the common label if Euroscepticism contains doubting, 
cynical and rejecting attitudes and that Eurosceptics may greatly vary in their exact 
arguments for opposing Europe (cf. 2007, 255-256). As so-called targets of political 
discontent, European authorities, the regime and the community have been mentioned 
(cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 256). The first mentioned source of discontent is the 
European authorities, the ones that are ‘calling the shots’. The term refers to various 
politicians as part of the political class and the performance of certain leaders within 
the EU and their respective integrity, legitimisation and driving forces (cf. Krouwel & 
Abts, 2007: 256). These ‘virtues’ and whether their commitment and motivation is 
driven by public interest are meticulously scrutinised from the side of Eurosceptics. 
Emerging questions such as  
“Are actors reliable in terms of keeping their promise? 
Are they predictable and consistent in their behaviour?”  
are not rarely asked, especially in the EP (Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257). For instance, 
van Rompuy as the EC president and Barroso as the ECM president are occasionally 
subject to sharp criticism concerning their accountability from Eurosceptic actors and 
parties. When discussing the competences of political actors, their support is 
dependent on their capabilities of being efficient, transparent and reliable in 
delivering the policies and regulations expected by the citizens (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 
2007: 257). The second target is the political regime, which encompasses the EU 
institutions. Herein, the citizens’ and Eurosceptic parties’ political discontent may 
derive from a pilloried lack of fairness and equity in the institutions and their 
disability to be responsive to their needs (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257). The 
institutions’ responsiveness towards citizens’ needs and interests is of utmost 
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importance for a successfully functioning EU, since a lack or even failure of it seems 
to only play into the hands of Eurosceptic populist parties and their leaders, claiming 
to represent the ‘common people’. However, whether the European citizen’s needs 
can be generalised at all, is a different question.  
 
Hard and Soft Euroscepticism 
When further specifying Euroscepticism, it is of prime importance to differentiate the 
term between what Taggart and Szczerbiak have coined as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
Euroscepticism. “Hard Euroscepticism” illustrates the firm and categorical rejection 
of a country’s membership in the EU as well as the objection of the EU in its sheer 
existence as a supranational institution. “Soft Euroscepticism” bolsters the EU’s 
existence in its current shape as a political institutions and favours the country’s 
membership, however, strongly disagrees with certain EU policies, fearing situations 
when national interests are conflictive with them (2002: 7). Thus, UKIP is a hard 
Eurosceptic party.  
 
3.3.2. Patterns of Euroscepticism  
 
In the attempt to specify right-wing Euroscepticism, it is crucial not to pigeonhole it 
automatically as a general right-wing attitude. At the same time, it must be 
acknowledged that characteristically right-wing extremist or new right-wing populist 
amalgamations will lean towards Euroscepticism, arguing for a ‘preservation of the 
nation state (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 10). It is crucial to carve out that Euroscepticism is a 
highly far-reaching term, encompassing the whole range of positions when it comes to 
political meaning, and, thus, cannot be assigned to merely a left- or right wing 
political camp. When looking at right-wing Eurosceptic parties and their ideology, 
one finds that instead of mitigating the political objection towards merely one 
‘scapegoat’, they tend to “project their nationalism and their anti-immigration stance 
on to the EU” (Leconte, 2010: 109). Additionally, the new sphere of party politics is 
often seen in the future of emerging populist right parties, who successfully take up 
the worries of the ‘losers’ to accelerate the current alteration of the Western Eurpean 
party systems, when understanding Euroscepticism as an ideology (cf. Stratham, 
2008: 11; cf. Kriesi, 2005: 5). The rise of Euroscepticism in Europe can also be 
ascribed to an overall increased general discontent that is expressed by right-wing 
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populist entrepreneurs, claiming to speak in the name of the ‘common people  (cf. 
Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 253).  
 
3.4. British Euroscepticism  
3.4.1. Political Euroscepticism:  
 
In the case of the UK, Euroscepticism is born out of an objective position towards a 
supranational institution that neglects and thus, weakens the scope of action of the 
country as a nation state. Here, justified apprehension about the undermining of the 
power of national parliaments and less legitimate critique of the unelected EU 
institutions (ECM and European Central Bank (ECB)) is proclaimed and the 
Eurosceptic jargon is riddled with words like ‘unelected bureaucracy’, ‘European 
super-state’ and ‘Brussels dictatorship (cf. Teubert 2001; cf. Leconte, 2010: 55). The 
idea of an existing ‘democratic deficit’ on a European level has been coined by a pro-
European British author called Marquand in 1979, who worried about an emerging 
‘democratic deficit’1 originating from a lack of accountability in EU decision-making 
(cf. Leconte, 2010: 54).  
 
Ever since then, the word ‘democratic deficit’ has found its way not only onto the 
British political stage, but also into the usage of European Eurosceptic parties and 
their policies. The alleged lack of this ‘democratic deficit’ is upheld by not only by 
European, but particularly by British Eurosceptics when arguing “against the 
widening and deepening of the EU in terms of level and scope” and, above all, 
“against the powers of supranational institutions and/ or against a further transfer of 
sovereignty” (Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 3).   
 
From a Eurosceptic party perspective, the UK’s membership in the EU is frequently 
compared to other international organizations (such as the Commonwealth, NATO 
etc.). Eurosceptics put emphasis on the claim that with its reduction to merely “a 
province of a European superstate”, the EU would “doom the UK to a parochialism 
alien to British tradition” (Teubert, 2001: 73 & Leconte, 2010: 89). The type of 
Euroscepticism prevalent in the UK can also be called “instrumental Euroscepticism”, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Democratic Deficit: “The idea behind the notion of a ‘democratic deficit’ is that decisions in the EU 
are in some ways insufficiently representative of, or accountable to, the nations and peoples of Europe” 
(Lord, 2001: 165).  
23	  	  
meaning that people are doubting the direct benefits, deriving from the EU, on their 
domestic soil (Lubber & Scheepers, 2005: 227). Moreover, it has been mentioned that 
the more citizens disagree with their national governments and domestic institutions, 
the more they tend to be reluctant to support EU integration (cf. Krouwel &Abts, 
2007: 253 & cf. McLaren, 2002, 2005). 
 
Furthermore, as commonly known, Britain has not joined the Euro and the Schengen 
Agreement and avoided the expansion of qualified majority voting concerning areas 
like tax, foreign policy and defence and their prevalent national attitude towards these 
issues is not likely to change (cf. Grant, 2008: 1). De Vreese rightly argues that in 
Britain Euroscepticism is nurtured by a general decline of trust in authorities and 
institutions used by political Eurosceptic entrepreneurs to further deliver their 
message (cf. Nye et al., 1997; cf. Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2004; cf. Koruwel & Abts, 
2007 in de Vreese, 2007: 272).  
 
3.4.2. Economic Euroscepticism 
 
After the entrance into the European Community (EC) in 1973, the era of the iron 
lady Margaret Thatcher and her conservative government began. She strongly 
objected Brussels’ supranational ‘top-down’ influence as well as Britain’s 
membership in the European Monetary System and would have liked to see the UK’s 
political relations with Europe limited to free trade and efficient competition. Also, 
the UK’s national decision not to join the Eurozone in 2002 under former Premier 
Gordon Brown, fits into the picture of Eurosceptic Britain. Therefore, their refusal to 
join the Eurozone and their reluctance of accepting a top-down monetary union on EU 
level has been noticeable in the 1980’s as it is today.  
 
During the recent Euro crisis and the heated debates about potential changes in the 
Lisbon Treaty in December 2011 to save the Eurozone, the UK’s objective position 
towards the tax and budget pact in order to combat this European debt crisis became 
most evident, as it opted out as the only one of twenty-seven Member States. The 
respective changes would not allow ‘the City’2 to give the newly introduced 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  The City: The term ‘the City’ is a short-form for the financial district of London. Definition Free 
Merriam- Webster Dictionary.	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amendments on financial services a miss and, thus, would not reflect Britain’s 
interests (cf. BBC: 2011). Since the UK has been hit enormously by the crisis, its 
main national aim is to protect ‘the City’s’ processes to run smoothly through 
domestic politics without any regulations or limitations from Brussels for the ‘mere’ 
sake of saving the EU’s Eurozone. Farage has mentioned numerous times that the 
most suitable option for the UK would be leaving the EU and only taking part in 
economic trade relations. Nowadays, a tad more than half of the UK’s merchandise 
trade is done with the EU, but that does not seem to impress he Britons as they are 
convinced that would succeed and flourish globally anyway, independently from EU 
rules or regulations (cf. Grant, 2008: 2).  
 
Due to open borders and an increased and flexible mobility within EU-Member 
States, the labour markets have become highly competitive on the European stage. 
Especially in the UK, employees personally experience the consequences in form of 
shrinking real wages and intensely increased labour forces from other European states 
(cf. Video 5, 2011). Yet, what does distinguish the British one from other EU 
countries’ economies “is not only the size of its financial sector, but also its openness 
to foreign investment, including takeovers by foreign firms” (Grant, 2008: 6). Here, 
one could question the allegedly justifiable criticism about floods of immigration into 
the country, if there is no national regulation to avoid domestic job losses through 
foreign firm takeovers.  
 
3.4.3. Cultural & Immigrational Euroscepticism 
 
Potential reasons for Euroscepticism, observable in the British public, can be traced 
back to various roots. De Vreese mentions a wide range of reasons, such as fear of 
immigration and an animosity towards other cultures, but also fearing the loss of 
national identity (cf. 2007: 272). Particularly, when considering Eurosceptic notions 
and feelings of the ‘common people’, Kriesi pigeon-holes the potential way to success 
in the cultural and identity field by saying that “I expect the cultural aspects of the 
opening up of the borders to be more important for the mobilization of the ‘losers’ 
than the defence of their economic interests” (2005: 5). Here, the labelling ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’ refers to those people either benefiting or suffering from the 
consequences of globalisation and de-nationalisation in politics (cf. Statham, 2008: 
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11). Grant describes these ‘losers’ as tending to be from poorer backgrounds, obtained 
less education, fear an unknown future and generally travel less (cf. 2008: 5). In order 
to successfully criticise and denounce European-wide rather than national migration 
policies and the EU’s four freedoms as a threat not only to British citizens, but also to 
the preservation of their national traditions, the aforementioned mediatisation and 
dramatisation of political issues has frequently proven to be worthwhile (cf. Trenz & 
de Wilde, 2009: 11). The exaggeration of potential cultural and immigrational threats 
looming from the EU to the UK, the fear-mongering among the national citizens 
against alleged floods of immigrants and the ‘good old’ scapegoating tactics to blame 
the EU and their elites are seized by and high up on the agenda of the British 
Eurosceptic party UKIP (cf. Video 5, 2011). It is suggested that the UK citizens’ anti-
EU attitude derives from their strong desire to preserve national identity and deter 
threats to their cultural identity by promoting anti-immigrant sentiments (cf. Krouwel 
& Abts, 2007: 253). Since most of the British so-called “principle source of unskilled 
labour” derives from the newly-2004 and former communist EU-countries like Poland 
or Romania, their influx to Britain could possibly only be controlled by taking a new 
approach towards the European project in general (cf. Ford, 2012). 
 
3.4.4. British Euroscepticism and the News  
 
It is not in vain that the British media has been labelled one of the most ruthless ones 
in Europe since it “has a uniquely powerful and eurosceptic popular press” (Grant, 
2008: 3). Particularly, when it comes to reporting about EU-related issues, it has made 
a name for itself by being overly critical towards anything coming or deriving from 
Brussels, regardless of the political stance. About thirty million people in the UK are 
said to read a daily newspaper, however, three quarters of these papers are drawn 
towards rather anti-EU standpoints (cf. Grant, 2008: 3). Interestingly enough, it has 
been found that frequently “exposure to strategically framed news about EU politics 
fuels Euro-cynicism”, so news reporting specifically tailored to the masses or targeted 
audiences will most likely show the desired effect (de Vreese, 2007: 274). Deriving 
from these facts, Grant is convinced that the British media’s and public’s dislike of 
Europe might actually trigger opposition from British ministers towards EU decisions, 
simply out of fearing their reaction (cf. 2008: 2).  
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According to the Flash Eurobarometer (FEB) 2011 analysis, measuring the attitudes 
towards the EU in the UK issued by the European Commission, about 82 per cent of 
the questioned participants stated they only “knew very little or almost nothing about 
the EU” (2011: 5). Above all, “respondents felt that EU reports on television, radio 
and, particularly, in the written press were too negative” and even “almost half (48%) 
perceived a negative bias in press reports” (FEB, 2011: 5). Public doubts, opposition 
and skepticism are nourished by frequently falsely presented facts about the EU and 
its processes and it does not really help that EU-reporting by serious journalists is 
tendentiously or even simply wrong (cf. Grant, 2008: 4). Conclusively, one can infer 
that the British media has the potential of fuelling and reducing Eurosceptic 
sentiments within the country (cf. de Vreese, 2007: 280).  
 
3.5. UKIP - Euroscepticism as a Strategy  
Rob Ford has outlined the existence of populist right-wing parties, their Eurosceptic 
core concerns and ideas as they are occurring in Britain as an agenda of four main 
points (cf. 2012).  
1. “Ethnic nationalism” to protect national identity from ‘alien influences’. 
2. “Authoritarianism to maintain social order and support the rule of established 
means of authority. 
3. “Xenophobia” as emotional feeling of fear, triggered by the different or the 
unknown. 
4. A form of “Populism” that turns away from mainstream politics and towards 
the ‘real’ interest of the common man.  
According to him, Eurosceptic populists in Britain particularly emphasise the public’s 
frustration over repeated denials from both parties, Labour and the Conservatives, to 
offer a national referendum on Europe to the British citizens and their reluctance to 
take a severe revision of the relationship with the EU into mere consideration (cf. 
2012). They argue against the British government parties and EU politics as an “elite-
clique maintaining self-serving links” with “notorious spending and accounting 
habits” and describe Europe and particularly the EU as the root of all evil (Ford, 
2012). British jobs and their cultural identity are described as being threatened by EU 
immigration, other faulted arguments include that EU’s judicial regulations are 
jeopardising British citizens’ safety by protecting the ‘enemy’, aka terrorists and 
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criminals and Britain’s sovereignty as being sacrificed for the sake of a ‘United States 
of Europe’ (cf. Ford, 2012).  
 
When looking at British Euroscepticism in numbers, UKIP’s electoral success with 
16.5 per cent in the 2009 EP elections is proof of it (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 37). The 
populist party seeks the UK’s exit from the EU and Taggart describes the UKIP as 
being “on the fringes of the party system” in Britain, having an agenda that is solely 
conditioned towards EU issues (1997: 8). UKIP has often been labelled a ‘single-
issue’ party, which designates its raison d’être mostly from its opposition towards the 
EU. Their ‘style’ has been described as “populist politics of grievance”, with the aim 
of evoking the citizen’s suspicion of the EU and whose style surfs on the wave of 
general British fatigue towards the European project (cf. Mycock, 2012). As their 
leader, Farage has criticised the entire domestic political class (Conservatives, Labour 
and LibDems) as never having been more out of touch, by cutting domestic spending 
in favour of an increased EU-related one (cf. Barnett, 2010). In UKIP’s notion, 
Europe represents a foreign power that seeks to disregard the will of domestic voters 
and imposes alien values instead of fostering traditional ones (cf. Ford, 2012).  
 
In this regard, Leconte’s finding that “parties of government tend to be Europhile, 
while protest-based parties tend to be Eurosceptic” should be taken into account 
(2010: 107). Arguably, Farage’s party can be seen as an epitome of a protest-based 
party on the national British as well as on the EU level. Since it has started off as this 
single-issue party favouring only the aim of Britain’s final withdrawal from the EU, it 
has furthered its agenda in order to be taken seriously on the political stage in Britain. 
Moreover, ‘contemporary’ UKIP calls for “allowing the relief of business from 
crushing regulation and the less well off from the burden of taxes, shutting off the 
flood of immigrants and freeing enterprise”, whereby the party clearly unites almost 
stereotypical Eurosceptic arguments in their ‘manifesto’ (UKIP – Official Website, 
2011). The reasoning behind UKIP’s Eurosceptic standpoints, could be explained by 
considering Leconte’s idea that  
two broad types can be put forward to account for parties’ attitudes towards 
European integration: their strategies in relation to government, and their 
general ideology. Whereas the first type of factor explains party-based 
Euroscepticism as a result of strategic calculations, the second type of factor 
relates Euroscepticism to a party’s identity and Weltanschauung. (2010: 106).  
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Leconte’s insights into party-based Euroscepticism loom large when looking at UKIP. 
Here, it is inevitable to look at Euroscepticism as a strategy when it comes to 
government participation and political representation in this respect. She rightly states 
the assumption that “government participation is barely compatible with anti-EU 
positions or even strong Euroscepticism” (Leconte, 2010: 106ff.). So far, UKIP has 
never had a single seat in the House of Commons and, thus, has never played an 
active and crucial role in British national politics. However, the party has been 
represented in the European parliament for more than a decade (since 1999) and 
currently has 12 MEPs (cf. UKIP – Official Website, 2012). Seeing themselves as a 
protest-based party, favouring Britain’s withdrawal in order to “regain our self-
governing democracy”, UKIP has no intention, let alone ‘obligation’ to moderate its 
Eurosceptic views (UKIP – OW, 2011). The term ‘democratic deficit’ coined by 
Marquand has nested itself in the official UKIP manifesto in form of arguments like 
restoring self government and democracy, abolishing unelected commissioners who 
dictate 75 per cent of British laws and finally providing the British people with a 
long-desired referendum on the EU membership (cf. UKIP – Official Website, 2011). 
As Leconte is arguing, for protest-based populist parties like UKIP, an anti-system 
approach towards the European project helps collecting those votes that generally 
oppose the domestic political mainstream establishment and therefore have to oppose 
the EU as well (cf. 2011: 107). Whether Euroscepticism as a strategy will actually be 
the key to success for UKIP in the long run, remains to be seen.  
 
4. Analysis  
 
First Part: Quantitative Results and Their Analysis 
 
Farage’s Rhetoric Strategies  
The initial part of the first analysis chapter deals with Farage’s form of rhetoric 
strategy in his language and carves out its most distinct Eurosceptic and populist 
features. His language has been ‘broken up’ into five categories established me in 
order to classify these features into comprehensive components. For the analysis of 
only one video, a qualitative approach would have been suitable and sufficient. 
However, in order to be able to draw representational conclusions, allowing meto 
make generalisations about Farage’s rhetoric tools, a quantitative examination of a 
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variety of videos is necessary. In other words, a quantitative analysis of the five 
established categories is inevitable to receive generally valid results and shows that 
Farage’s usage of them is not random, but indeed well intended and thought through 
as a systematic use of rhetorical figures in his speeches contributes to supporting his 
cause. The quantitative numbers serve as a justification for the established categories, 
examining Farage’s rhetorical tools.  
 
Table – Categories  
Numbers in all twenty-nine videos: 
 
Table 1.3 
 
Key Words & Repetitions 
Democracy4 
 
Referendum Bully-
boys 
Unelected Economic 
prison 
EU-
Titanic 
European 
Project 
77 17 2 18 7 3 18 
 
Table 2. 
 
Metaphors & 
Illustrations 
Colloquialisms & 
Offences 
Usage of Pronouns Patterns of 
Identification & 
Solidarity 
103 304 1601 130 
 
 
4.1. Farage’s Language  
4.1.1. Key Words & Repetitions 
 
Through a repetition of his virtually most crucial terms in a political context, Farage 
manages the successful implementation of the theory that “repeating certain phrases 
{and words N.H.} contributes towards making the ideas contained in them seem 
‘common’ sense” (Jones & Wareing, 1999: 39). By emphasising these key words 
repeatedly, his speeches are equipped with a polemical ‘touch’, which serves the 
purpose of bolstering his political arguments. It could also well be called 
psychological political warfare.  
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For a detailed overview over the respective numbers in every video, please see attachments.  4	  Democracy as the first key word should be understood as an umbrella term, as the counting of the 
word in the videos also encompasses the usage of its variations, such as democrat, democratic, 
undemocratic and anti-democratic. 	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Democracy:  
Throughout the twenty-nine videos, the term democracy and its variations are 
mentioned seventy-seven times, which makes it the most frequently used one of the 
key words.  In particular, Farage strongly argues for a ‘correct’ implementation of the 
concept of national democracy. According to him, this involves an adequate 
consideration of the EU nation states, their respective national democracies and 
referenda for all European citizens, giving them the chance to voice their opinion on 
supranational EU policy decisions (Video 29, 2011). In populist manner, Farage 
claims to speak in the name of democracy and attempts to “cash in democracy’s 
promise of power to the people” (Canovan, 1999: 2). Furthermore, by emphasising 
the importance and lack of democracy on EU level in his arguments, he presents 
himself as “saving democracy from the elite and corrupt politicians” (Zaslove, 2004: 
64).  
 
Referendum:  
The word referendum is mentioned seventeen times and has an important role in 
Farage’s chain of arguments. By calling for popular referenda about all EU policies in 
the affected respective Member States, Farage mainly asks for the implementation of 
democracy by asking the people. Not only does he demand referenda about the EU 
membership in Britain, but also emphasises that the Irish said no to the Lisbon Treaty 
and that the Greek should be given a referendum on the question of the Eurozone 
membership (cf. Video 8, 2012, cf. Video 4, 2008; cf. Video 6, 2012). Therefore, he 
also fulfils Canovan’s argument that populists tend to favour ‘direct democracy’ that 
incorporates “political decision-making by referendum and popular initiative“ when 
he appeals for a consideration of the Irish, French, Greek, Dutch and British 
referendum for the sake of democracy (Canovan, 1999: 2; cf. Video 4, 2008; cf. 
Video 6, 2012). By constantly demanding referenda as a ‘window of hope’ out of the 
supranational EU and the lasting Eurozone crisis, the politician displays his form of 
Euroscepticism (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 7).  
 
Bully-boys:  
Although the exact phrase ‘Bully-boys’ is only used twice in all videos, similar 
expressions occur various times. This term is a derogatory description of the 
European elite ‘guys’ (Barroso and van Rompuy in particular) calling the shots in 
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Brussels by stigmatising them as merely ‘boys’, who are unreliable and do not keep 
their promises of growth and jobs for the EU (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257; cf. 
Video 16, 2012). Herewith, he spawns distrust in the political elite among the people 
by weakening their position and reputation, showing that he does not take them 
seriously. Through labelling Barroso and van Rompuy as “Bully-boys”, Farage 
regards them and their policy-making as a dominating “elitist theory of politics” and 
strongly objects it as entirely neglecting the ‘common’ European people (SSD, 2008). 
This, in turn, is considered a populist strategy (cf. Williams, 2010: 15).  
 
Unelected:  
The evoking of distrust and cynicism among the people, is also ignited by his usage of 
and emphasis on the word ‘unelected’ for eighteen times throughout the videos. By 
pointing out the EU’s and the political class’ lack of accountability and legitimacy, he 
piques the audiences’ feeling of wanting a saying in this European issue by appealing 
to their rights to do so (cf. Video 3, 2010; cf. Video 13, 2010; cf. Krouwel & Abts, 
2007: 257). Stigmatising the European elite as “unelected non-entities, Farage 
expresses his consideration of them as “technically incompetent and morally corrupt” 
– this is also characteristic for populist strategies (Video 17, 2011; cf. Fennema, 2005 
cited in Williams, 2010: 115; Williams, 2010: 115).  
 
Economic prison:  
The highly illustrative metaphor of the Euro as an ‘economic prison’ is used seven 
times and serves to describe the Eurozone as an economic trap with high ‘regulative 
steel bars’ and a vanishing low chance of ‘escape’ for its Member States. By 
dramatising the political situation with disproportionate metaphors, Farage’s own 
arguments with the usage of fear-mongering against it might fall on sympathetic ears 
among his audience (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 11).  
 
EU-Titanic:  
Similarly, the metaphor Euro-Titanic, used only thrice, also takes the same line as 
economic prison. With the mentioning of this word, history is being help up and the 
pointing towards the well-known end of the Titanic, the inevitable ending of the 
Eurozone towards ‘economic iceberg’, is being foreshadowed.  
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European project:  
The phrase ‘European project’ is mentioned eighteen times and mainly used to 
describe the EU and its various policies, such as economic or political ones, and 
relates it to the pro-European political elite. Farage implements the phrase to depict 
the EU as their product, particularly that of Barroso and van Rompuy. He laments the 
fact that in order to preserve ‘their European project’, any controversial political 
decision in the name of pursuing the plan towards a ‘United States of Europe’ is 
justified.    
 
4.1.2. Metaphors & Illustrations  
 
With the counting of 103 metaphors throughout the videos, Farage’s language in his 
speeches and interviews is riddled with a high number of metaphors and illustrations. 
A selection of those is chosen to exemplify this chapter. Presenting political issues in 
an immensely vivid and lively language not only captures the audiences’ attention, 
but also curbs their imagination and helps depicturing these often highly abstract and 
complex processes. With the help of metaphors as strategic populist rhetoric, Farage 
is able to ‘serve’ abstract political procedures in a simplified and comprehensive – not 
necessarily correct - manner particularly to “politically less-sophisticated individuals” 
(de Vreese, 2007: 274). The usage of metaphors arguably signifies a certain amount 
of creativity that he places within his language to make it more appealing. In Farage’s 
case the questions of persuasiveness and beguilement could be raised and whether in a 
political context a metaphorical language is more or less successful than literal one. 
What it certainly does, however, is evoking attention and stir agitation among his 
audience as is observable especially in Video 3 when he is comparing van Rompuy to 
a “damp rag” (2010). The politician colours his Eurosceptic political arguments with 
comparative metaphors of the EU being a big ship out in the “open Atlantic in a huge 
storm with massive waves” and its member countries falsely believing that being “all 
on the ship together, hoping to be somehow safer”, are awfully misled (Video 7, 
2011). In Farage’s reality “the EU Titanic has now hit the iceberg” and has evolved 
into “an EU with the economic prison of the Euro” (Video 24, 2012). By using the 
metaphor of the EU-Titanic, he ignites the collective memory of the European 
peoples, as he puts the word onto the ‘table’ and leaves it to the audience to finish the 
thought about the well-known tragic ending of it. With the term ‘economic prison’, 
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Farage suggests that without breaking up the Eurozone or letting the weak Member 
States leave, the economic, political and human disaster in countries like Greece or 
Spain is inevitable (cf. Video 20, 2012).   
  
Other comparative metaphors are used to harshly criticise the EU’s and van 
Rompuys’ claim that the Euro stands for a strategy and a “remedy to create growth 
and jobs and yet it is actively destroying both of those things”, so the “medicine is 
killing the patient” (Video 16, 2012). Farage calls the Eurozone an “economic prison” 
and, in his eyes, maintaining it and its instable currency would be “increasing the 
dosage” and thus be “madness” and “economic suicide for an entire continent” (Video 
11, 2011; Video 16, 2012). By stigmatising the Euro as the actual ‘poison’ instead of 
the intentioned ‘medicine’, Farage predicts the ‘economic death’ for the patient 
Europe and its people. Also, with this metaphor, the Eurozone issue is illustrated and 
emphasises his oppositional attitude towards the Euro. Additionally, he compares a 
European commissioner’s staff, which was sent to Greece to monitor the financial 
processes as a condition to the bailout money, to a “Gauleiter”5 (Video 20, 2012). 
After being criticised for it, Farage justifies his metaphorical choice of word by 
saying that it was indeed “the UK’s biggest Sunday selling newspaper used that 
word”, which proves not only his Eurosceptic attitude, but also the British media’s 
strategically-framed Eurocynical and Eurosceptic news reporting (Video 28, 2012; cf. 
Grant, 2008: 3). Not only serve metaphors and illustrations like these the colouration 
of his arguments, but they also contribute to a linguistic-rhetoric dramatisation of the 
prevalent political circumstances. Farage’s picturesque dramatisation needs to be 
understood as what Trenz & de Wilde called “an essential element of 
Euroscepticism”, so the performer’s Eurosceptic narratives dramatically depict the 
danger of certain European nuisances (2009, 11). Especially the current political and 
economic precarious situations in Europe scarred by crisis, particularly with regard to 
the Euro, provide an excellent futile soil for his populist-metaphorical arguments. 
Dramatisations such as the Brit’s argument that by remaining within the Eurozone, 
“the country of Greece and its people are being put to the sword” and even “sacrificed 
at the European altar, all in the name of preserving the European project” successfully 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Gauleiter: a) a district leader in Nazi Germany who served as a provincial governor; b) a subordinate 
official resembling a Nazi gauleiter in function or in autocratic manner. Definition: Free Merriam-
Webster Dictionary.   
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tap into various niches at the same time (Video 6, 2012). First of all, it is a biblical / 
religious comparative metaphor, which evokes mixed feelings about people being 
tortured and sacrificed for potentially dubious reasons. Secondly, a highly complex 
and economically challenging situation is presented in an immensely simplified 
manner, which does not matter-of-factly do justice to or reflect the actual 
circumstances. Thirdly, the intentionally vivid exaggeration of these circumstances 
appeals to the audience’s feeling of collective responsibility and guilt towards the 
country and its people. Thus, Farage seeks to ‘awaken’ the audience and to arouse 
their urge for action by reminding his audience of the course of the latest European 
history. He states that “sixty years ago an iron curtain came down on Europe, but now 
with this commission there is an economic fist” (Video 18, 2010).  
 
Lastly, Farage illustratively argues that he thought, “not even the EU could not sink to 
those depths” of demanding “diplomacy at gunpoint” from Greece and spreading 
“chaos, fear and anger” among the people (Video 20, 2012; Video 1, 2012).  Yet, he 
is constantly stating that “the Euro is doomed” and “the sky will not fall in if Greece 
leaves the Eurozone” (Video 9, 2012; Video 16, 2012). Herewith, on the one hand his 
metaphorical language is used as fear-mongering, prudently anticipating the European 
peoples’ worries of a similar treatment (Video 1, 2012). On the other hand, he is de-
escalating a potential Greece-Eurozone-withdrawal-situation by saying that there will 
be “a boom in tourism and investment” for this country (Video 16, 2012). In the long 
run, these dramatising metaphors and illustrations he uses may serve to prove and 
foster his point about the end of the Eurozone not meaning the end of the ‘Europe 
world’.  
 
Interestingly enough, his metaphors are rather ‘technical’ instead of ‘nature-related’, 
which could be associated with Britain as the origin of industrialisation. What can be 
said conclusively about Farage’s usage of metaphors is that he seeks to demonstrate 
political processes descriptively and pique the ravages of time, the awareness of 
history and the lessons it taught among the audience.  
 
 
 
 
35	  	  
4.1.3. Colloquialisms & Offences   
 
Throughout his speeches and interviews, Farage’s language is characterised by 304 
colloquialisms and offences towards political ‘enemies’ and antagonists. An informal 
and relatively simple choice of language ensures that not only the academic and 
politically versed people can understand, but also those with a less sophisticated 
background and political knowledge. This can be seen as a diffuser of his political 
content and message among the whole broad range of electoral audiences. With 
strategically framed news about political circumstances in form of populist rhetoric 
and informal expressions, he manages to fuel existing anti-sentiments and public 
distrust about the EU institutions and the political elites among his audience (cf. de 
Vreese, 2007: 274). By attempting to evoke cynicism and anger among his audience, 
he himself is rather cynical when throwing his offences on the EP table. His direct 
verbal attacks include colloquialisms and substantial offences against his self-
announced political enemies, which serves the purpose of channelling his actual 
message into a rather sarcastic and mocking direction, mainly doubting the 
competence of the political ruling class and figures (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257). 
Furthermore, it serves the purpose of positioning himself on the side of the ‘common’ 
European people by speaking ‘their language’ rather than teaming up with the ‘out of 
touch’ political European ‘elite’. The side effect, however, is that the choice of 
informal language can also mean less credibility and seriousness.  
 
A remarkable portion of cynicism can be found in comments like “well, you’re back 
Mr. van Rompuy, no doubt a reward for your great success” and “we have seen these 
old scare tactics” whereas remarks such as “Mr. Sarkozy, worst of all is the sheer 
arrogance of saying that you know best when it comes to the European project” and 
“Mr. Barroso, {…}, these comments look ridiculous” are clear and unequivocal 
verbal offences against individual politicians (Video 10, 2012; Video 7, 2011; Video 
4, 2008; Video 9, 2012). The most notorious one is probably his offence against 
Rompuy insulting him as having “the charisma of a damp rag and the appearance of a 
low-grade bank clerk” (Video 3, 2010). Frequently used colloquialisms include verbal 
attacks in order to topple Brussels’ “unelected puppets” and denigrate them by 
claiming that “these guys treat democracy with absolute contempt” (Video 25&26, 
2011). Consequently, Farage states that it is high time for Britain to “make the great 
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escape” while “you lot head for disaster” – all these are comments, which are mainly 
aimed at Europhile politicians, parties and the elite (Video 2, 2011; Video 26&27, 
2011; Video 17, 2011). In Eurosceptic manner, Farage informally points out that 
long-known problems, like the ‘unelected puppets’’ lack of accountability, but merely 
names ‘Britain’s great escape’ from the EU as only potential solution (cf. Trenz & de 
Wilde, 2009: 7).  
 
It has been argued before that exposure to strategic news contributes to cynicism 
among the audience and Farage presents political issues on an informal platter by 
downgrading his political enemies (cf. de Vreese, 2007: 274; cf. Dülffer, 2007). This 
tactic often proves to be effective and successful when he is touching the soft spot of 
political dissatisfaction not only among fellow politicians, but also among the 
electoral public. By attempting to score points with people being disappointed with 
mainstream-politics, politically apathetic ones and the ‘common’ people, Farage’s 
strategy of an informal and offensive language to gain support might indeed be highly 
efficient. This also mirrors typical right-wing populism features, using a disparaging 
language when declaring his “skepticism towards a coalescing Europe” (Hartleb, 
2011: 19). Especially offences towards single politicians, the political elite and his 
political enemies reflect a populist party leader’s conspicuous nature and are regarded 
as a linguistic tool to enforce his opposition to mostly Europhile mainstream parties 
and the ‘ruling European elite’. An informally- and derogatorily- given description of 
the EU institutions and their leaders helps Farage to emphasise and point out the 
“purported gap between the ‘people’ and the mainstream political establishment” 
(Deiwik, 2009: 5). Herewith, one can see his qualities as a successful, populist leader 
since it allows him to clearly position himself on the side of the people.  
 
Additionally, the usage of myriad colloquialisms and offences serves the purpose of 
simplifying matters and offering simple solutions for highly complex political 
problems, which has been described as a typically populist strategy (cf. Dülffer, 
2007). Farage’s simplifications, especially concerning the Eurocrisis, such as “why 
don’t we let them go” out of the Eurozone and “why can’t we do things as mature 
democracies” are not treating profound political issues adequately. Therefore, it leads 
to a populist, but obviously distorted presentation of problems and thus, causes 
populism to be associated with often negative connotations, since complex political 
37	  	  
issues are unlikely to have simple solutions (cf. Deiwik, 2009: 5). In Farage’s case, 
this occasionally results in him not being taken seriously by his audience and political 
counterparts.  However, what does contribute to an effective populist success is his 
usage of pronouns in this respect, which is examined in the next chapter. 
 
4.1.4. The Usage of Pronouns 
 
The usage of in total 1601 pronouns in twenty-nine videos in Farage’s language has a 
variety of purposes and effects. Firstly, their frequent utilisation contributes to 
emphasising the gap between the political elite and the ‘common’ people, by 
establishing virtually binary oppositions. These oppositions are presented in a ‘good’ 
vs. ‘bad’ form that praises the good ‘us’ as the saviours of Europe and stigmatises the 
antagonistic bad ‘them’ as the allegedly dangerous and menacing ‘other’. Herewith, 
Farage manages to portray the gap between the elite and the ‘people’ as an ‘us’ vs. 
‘them’ constellation, which also helps him as a populist leader to position himself on 
the side of the ‘people’. With a prudent use of these pronouns, Farage defines himself 
and his kind through differentiation from others, in this case the European ‘ruling 
class’ (cf. Dülffer, 2007). While he is blaming the political elite for many faulty 
procedures within the EU by saying that “they make an absolute mess of it” and “you 
are determined, but delusional in this attempt to keep the Euro propped up”, 
Eurosceptic Farage clearly delineates himself from Europhile politicians and parties 
stating that “they want to impose a United States of Europe on the people” (Video 7, 
2011; Video 10, 2012; Video 12, 2010). Shared interests and agreement between him 
and the ‘common’ people are highlighted with appeals such as “we’ve got to give {the 
Greek N.H.} people hope because out there now is absolute despair” and “why don’t 
we decide ourselves” (Video 16, 2012; Video 4, 2008). Interestingly enough, his 
solidarity with the Greek and Italian people through an increased usage of “I” and 
“we” shows that he does speak on behalf of the European people instead of only of 
the British ones (cf. Video 16, 2012; cf. Video 7, 2011). Furthermore, it contradicts 
Ford’s argument that British Euroscepticism and populist right-wing parties are 
labelled through xenophobia (cf. 2012). In these discussions, it becomes obvious that 
it hardly is the ‘foreigners’ he stigmatises as the ‘other’, but indeed the EU and its 
political elite.  
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Deriving from the argument that “by taking away from people their ability to govern 
themselves and transferring that power to the ECM, we're headed for a Europe of 
rebellion and violence, let's take the democratic route”, Farage seeks to align his 
personal interest to the collective ones of the European people (Video 29, 2011). His 
frequent usage of ‘I, we, us, our, you, they, them and their’ serves not only the 
purpose of moving the responsibility of a precarious political situation away from him 
and his kind (‘us’) towards ‘them’, his pre-defined ‘usual suspect’-scapegoats, namely 
the EU and its political elite. It also allows him to feather his nest among the 
‘common’ people as potential future voters for him as MEP and his UKIP party. 
Farage’s position as an MEP provides him with the chance to blame ‘them’ and 
simultaneously allows him to present UKIP’s agenda in the EP. Despite not being in 
the domestic British government and constituting ‘merely’ a minority party compared 
to the ‘mainstream parties’ Tories and Labour in Britain, Farage and UKIP have what 
Hartleb calls alleged “power without responsibility” (2011, 19). It allows Farage’s 
and UKIP’s populist attitude to be reactionary towards the government parties without 
having their amount of political responsibility (cf. Canovan, 1999: 5). In addition, by 
speaking about “we were told that when we had a president, we’d see a giant global 
political figure” and “I’m afraid what we got was you”, Farage speaks on the self-
announced behalf of and from within the ‘people’ and, thus, generalises the entire 
multitude of European people as being one homogenous group (Video 2, 2011). He 
asserts to be voicing the will of the European “silent majority of ordinary people 
whose interests and opinions are regularly overridden by arrogant elites” (Canovan, 
1999: 5). A suitable example is his comment declaring that “public opinion is saying 
they want a European cooperation, yes of course, I agree with that. What they do not 
want is this Europe run by unelected bureaucrats like Mr Barroso.” (Video 29, 2011).  
 
Secondly, the use of ‘I’ in many speeches and interviews helps Farage to maintain his 
position and to secure attention. By saying ‘I’, the popular will is embodied in his 
persona and by simply personalising political affairs in his appearance, the essential 
features of a charismatic leader are given. The politician proclaims that the elites can 
not be trusted (‘they’) and the ‘Bully-boys’ of Brussels would be dangerous men in 
Europe, so he intends to weaken the public’s trust in the governing class and 
strengthening his own position as a single-person representative and charismatic 
leader of the ‘common’ people, i.e. in fact as one of them. Comments such as “laws 
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are proposed by unelected Eurocrats like you, Mr. Barroso, I know the European 
Parliament voted for you, but you were the only candidate offered to us” and “I can 
say with confidence that I can speak on behalf of the majority of the British people” 
mirror this (Video 23, 2011; Video 3, 2010). 
 
Thirdly, however, the reasoning behind his immense usage of pronouns should be 
questioned. It is obvious that it ensures a substantial amount of his successful populist 
strategy and contributes to his provocative appearance. Yet, one could get the 
impression that Farage’s choice of pronouns is done in order to conceal unverifiable 
claims to avoid in-depth discussions or to cover up a lack of substantial political 
arguments from his side. His pronoun-bristled language often appears flippant and 
provocative to mask unprovable allegations, but one has to take into consideration 
that this might exactly be his refined, ‘well-tailored’ and intentioned strategy. 
Farage’s remarks such as “you blabber on about democracy” and “your Eurozone is a 
despicable pact” are not intrinsically constructive and comprehensive arguments 
(Video 20, 2012). Therefore, the main aim of these pronouns is to delineate himself 
and his kind from the European political leaders and to expressly underline his 
vehement opposition towards their policies.   
 
Conclusively, the usage of pronouns helps Farage dealing with the issue of political 
responsibility by allowing him to either actively push responsibility aside when 
disagreeing or to collectively immerse in and appeal for it, if it is for the sake of the 
‘common’ people. The issue of identification and solidarity is touched upon as well 
and the next chapter will briefly outline the main details of it.  
 
4.1.5. Patterns of Identification & Solidarity  
 
When looking at patterns of identification and solidarity in Farage’s language, one 
finds the same reasoning as above. By standing ‘on the side of democracy’, he argues 
that “democracy is actually deliberately and wilfully being destroyed by people who 
will do anything to prop up their failed European project” and that “we, the people 
and citizens of European nation states need to wake up” (Video 7, Video 25 & 26, 
2011). He intends to evoke collective solidarity with “we need to recognise that a 
terrible mistake has been made” and appeals to a shared responsibility between the 
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European leaders and nation states on a European level when demanding “we’ve got 
to restore democracy and human dignity” in Greece (Video 16, 2012). Yet, while 
speaking for identification and solidarity on a European level before, some true 
colours of nationalism are shining through when he proclaims the same on a domestic 
or national level. He strongly argues for the preservation of British interests, such as 
“we need to protect our country” and “we go on paying you 50 million pounds a day”, 
so his personal identification and solidarity is individually adapted and respectively 
amended according to the current situation and political debate (Video 5, 2011; Video 
17, 2011). Acting accordingly to populist strategies and what Fennema calls “the 
common man is basically good and his opinions are always sound”, Farage assumes 
that the reason and the values of the common European people are righteous and 
should not be questioned, therefore he solidarises with them and positions himself on 
their side (2005, cited in Williams, 2010: 115).  
 
What Farage also pursues is a victimisation of the European and the British national 
citizens. By saying that “we’ve seen Greece reduced to nothing more than a 
protectorate”, “we {the UK, N.H.} find ourselves without friend in the room” and 
“I’ve been certain from the start that Greece and Portugal should be set free” from 
their economic prison, he portrays the submission of these countries by the EU and 
actively seeks their political redemption from it (Video 3, 2010; Video 17, 2011; 
Video 7, 2011). This also reflects what Hellström calls “populism as style”, meaning 
a personalisation of politics by displaying solidarity, which works especially well 
when presented by a charismatic leader, like Farage (2012: 9).  
 
4.2. Lee’s Four Populist Strategies Applied to Farage 
 
1) invokes a virtuous people ‘portrayed as heroic defenders’ of time-
honored values (358);  
2) identifies this rhetorically constituted people against a rhetorically 
constituted enemy ‘hoarding power’ (359);  
3) further compounds the enemy rhetoric by claiming to work against a 
‘system’ (like government or the economy) once virtuous but now 
‘sullied’ (360); and  
4) expresses an ‘apocalyptic confrontation’ or a ‘mythic battle’ set in a 
political order on the verge of collapse (362).  
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The first of Lee’s four populist strategies can easily be applied to the chosen range of 
Farage’s speeches in the EP and his interviews with TV channels. Herein, Farage 
describes virtuous European peoples, who are heroically defending a number of 
valuable and ‘time-honoured’ national and European values. What can be counted as 
these values is his emphasis on the significance to have a “Europe of sovereign nation 
states” rather than a “United States of Europe” and also include Eurosceptic ideas 
(Video 11, 2011). He advocates a fostering of the nation states’ unfettered ability to 
“run their own affairs” and calls for an empowerment of the ‘common people’ (Video 
27, 2011). The politician tends to presents himself and his kind as the brave, 
reasonable and righteous defenders of these values, stating that “we need to protect 
our country” and its national interests (Video 5, 2011). By elevating the European 
peoples with their respective representatives to heroic defenders, Farage stigmatises 
them as the last saviours before “the EU heads off on the Titanic towards an economic 
and democratic disaster” (Video 17, 2011). The applied rhetoric reflect his preference 
in terms of a redistribution of political power in favour of empowering the ‘common 
people’, assuming that their reason and common sense is right and reliable (cf. SSD, 
2008; cf. Fennema, 2005).   
 
Also the second populist strategy can well be applied to Farage. On the one hand, his 
constituted people encompass the entire peoples of Europe against the ‘elitist’ “bully-
boys in Brussels”, Barroso and van Rompuy in particular, and the European political 
ruling class as the proclaimed ‘hoarding power’ (Video 7, 2011). On the other hand, it 
also encompasses the national British people against the enemy EU as “supporting the 
destruction of nation states” (Video 29, 2011).  
 
The third strategy works particularly well for Farage to further develop his quest 
against the EU-enemy and omnipresent Brussels machinery. By saying that “post 
1945, there were some very sensible ideas put together, namely the Council of 
Europe” and that “a Europe where we sit down together, where we have a free trade 
agreement, where we agree minimum standards on work, on the environment” is the 
desirable choice of Europe and argues for a European cooperation “without the ECM, 
without a EP and without a European Court of Justice (ECJ)” (Video 29, 2011). So 
Farage claims that the once virtuous ideas from having the Council of Europe have 
now evolved into and changed to a sullied and remote contemporary EU that is out-
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of-touch with the people. He faults that “the EC has failed us over the last couple of 
years” and emphasises that he forcefully opposes its current existence (Video 7, 
2011).  Criticising a once virtuous, but now sullied idea, his applied populist strategy 
also pays attention to the public demands, combating the risk that elites of 
government might prove “incapable of responding to them” (Williams, 2010: 115).  
 
Lastly, Farage expresses his relentless battle against the European political elite in 
order to secure and defend the sovereignty of European nation states. His 
confrontational populist quest aims at avoiding Europe’s succumb to the ‘dominant’ 
European ruling class and, thus finally, a “United States of Europe” (Video 16, 2011). 
By describing the Eurozone as a quagmire and “economic prison”, he claims that the 
EU in its current form is heading for “a Europe of rebellion and violence” and merely 
proposes “the democratic route” as “a positive way forward” (Video 29, 2011). This 
is done in a highly cynical manner by saying that “nobody in these countries actually 
is having the courage to stand up for national democracy” to fuel Euroscepticism and 
public distrust about European politics and politicians (Video 11, 2011). It also draws 
attention to the urgent necessity of his battle against them as the EU aka “you lot head 
for disaster” (Video 17, 2011).  
 
4.3. Farage As a Populist Leader – Brief Evaluation of His   
Qualities 
 
When looking at his strategic rhetoric, Farage fulfils all the essential aforementioned 
features and skills of a successful, populist charismatic leader. Due to his verbal 
‘peacock’ aura and rumbustious choice of language, he can be sure to capture the 
attention of is audience and his political ‘fellow players’ by showing rigorous quality 
in leadership. By dividing the European political stage into two adversarial camps, the 
‘unelected Brussels’ elite’ and the European peoples and by clearly positioning 
himself on the side of ‘the people’, Farage intends to personify the interests and 
opinions of the ‘common’ people. He manages to seize the existing gap between the 
elite and people to his benefits and, thus, strengthens his position as leader and 
representative of the ‘common’ people. Simultaneously, he stigmatises the EU 
institutions and its leaders as being incompetent to cater for the enforcement of the 
European’s public interests and as a severe impediment to democracy and national 
sovereignty. Therefore, Farage portrays himself as the required brave ‘saviour’ of the 
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people and their time-honoured values from the ‘dire’ elitist political class. With a 
combination of all his qualities, the politician ensures that his UKIP party receives 
sufficient and in the long-run also successful attention and votes.  
 
Second Part: Qualitative Analysis - Farage Out on the Limb Against the EU 
 
4.4. In General – Against the EU as a Political Union 
 
When looking at Farage’s quest against the EU ‘dictatorship’, one needs to 
distinguish his opposition into two parts. Not only does he ‘bravely fight’ against the 
EU as a political union and its sheer existence, but also against the European political 
elite. Firstly, this chapter looks at his opposition towards the EU itself, whereas the 
second one is dedicated to his campaign against the European elite and the ‘unelected’ 
men on top of the EU institutions.   
 
The British politician’s first target is the EU as a political union, which encompasses 
institutions such as the ECM, the EP and the ECJ. By illustrating the obvious, 
undeniable differences between the various European countries along with their 
individual economic and political ‘crosses to bear’, he argues that “we should not be 
forced together in the same political union” (Video 7, 2011). In order to prove his 
point, the politician reverts to drastic comparative arguments by contrasting the EU 
and its Member States to the Balkan war in the 1990’s when Yugoslavia was split up. 
By evoking mixed feelings about the commemorable events of this war, Farage 
reminds his audience of the potential repercussion when “countries are being 
artificially forced together” (Video 7, 2011). This proceeding aims at inducing 
feelings of guilt, unperceived responsibility and of a bad conscience among his 
audience for favouring a supranational political project, which might eventually 
endanger national democracy, freedom and stability. In order to prove his point and 
express his substantial criticism, the politician resorts to an illustrative ‘European 
history’-speech, proclaiming that “in generations to come, children will be told a 
story” (Video 18, 2010). Herein, according to Farage, it will become obvious that 
‘back in the days’, the ECM’s “plan was flawed and their fanciful monetary scheme 
collapsed” and by denying the European people a ‘genuine’ saying in the form of 
referendums concerning the matter of having a political union, the story is likely to 
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finish with “in the end, those people had to resort to violence to get back their nation 
states and their democracy” (Video 18, 2010). Herein, the Eurosceptic parties’ and the 
European citizens’ political discontent and repudiation with the supranational body 
derives from a pilloried lack of fairness and equity in the institutions and their 
disability to tailor policies to national needs (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 257). The 
institutions’ responsiveness towards citizens’ needs and interests is of utmost 
importance for a successfully functioning EU, since a lack or even failure of it would 
only play into the hands of Eurosceptic populist parties and their leaders, claiming to 
represent the actual ‘common people’.  
 
One form of Euroscepticism has been described as “incorporating outright and 
unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” and to supranational 
institutions (Taggart, 1997: 4). Farage’s strong defiance towards an existence of a 
supranational institution, i.e. the EU, and an elevation of powers from a national 
towards a supranational European level is highly visible in many of his speeches. He 
does make his point when stating that “I want to live in a Europe, of democratic 
nation states that trade together, not a Europe where Germany calls the shots and face 
these bureaucrats taking over our democracies” (Video 15, 2012). In this respect, 
Farage not only portrays his opposition towards these supranational institutions, but 
also his resistance towards a political union in which certain countries are dominant.  
 
Frequently addressed topics of British Eurosceptics encompass the categorical 
opposition to an elevation of powers to supranational institutions and warnings 
against a further transfer of national sovereignty and powers towards the EU (cf. 
Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 3). As a Brit and as leader of a Eurosceptic party, Farage 
represents these Eurosceptic features, which are reflecting a general, in Britain 
decreasing trust in governments and political institutions. With sentences like “the EU 
does not know what to do” and claims that “law-making in the EU should be reduced 
to national laws” and “we need self-determined borders in the UK”, clearly mirrors 
his stance in which the EU is regarded as an endangerment of the nation state and in 
which he fears the substitution of national laws by ‘public-remote’ supranational ones 
(Video 5, 2011). Farage is agitating against the supranational institution in 
reproaching them that “over 75 per cent of our national laws in Britain are made by 
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the EU” and, thus, proclaiming the need for a British “independent judiciary” (Video 
1, 2012).  
 
His call for self-determined borders is rooted in his claim that “the UK is the most 
overcrowded country in the EU”, being entirely flowed with immigrants since “the 
total free movement of people since 2004” (Video 1, 2012). Herein, Farage’s 
victimisation of the British people and a pigeon-holing of them into so called ‘winners 
and losers’ of European immigration regulations is clearly visible. In order to avoid 
“cultural threats to the nation state as well as anti-immigrant sentiments” among the 
population, the populist politician proposes the ‘only way out’ of this migration by 
calling for a change in the British relationship with Europe (Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 
253; cf. Video, 17, 2011). Yet, as a British Eurosceptic populist, he seems to be 
mobilising or igniting hostility towards immigration, due to the four European 
freedoms, in the British public. That is done by stating that it often brings 
“ghettoisation in cities and towns” and that from “the 1st of May, our social security 
system will give people from Poland the same rights to unemployment benefits as we 
have” (Video 5, 2011; cf. Brown, 2012). But, when shedding a clearer light on this 
issue, it is not the foreigners he blames for the “mass migration to the UK”, but in fact 
Britain’s membership in the EU (cf. Video 5, 2011). Farage predicts that “Britain is 
going to make the great escape, we are going to get out of this union, we’ll be the first 
European country to get our freedom back” and argues that “what we’ll have is our 
democracy back, our liberty back and we’ll have influence in the world as you lot 
head for disaster” (Video 1, 2012; Video 17, 2011). With these claims, Farage 
confirms Grant’s argument that he himself and many Brits are convinced that their 
country would thrive as a global hub for trade and investment around the world, 
unaffected by rules and regulations from Brussels (cf. 2008: 2).   
 
Concerning the Euro, the Eurozone and its crisis, the politician has clear standpoints 
as to what he regards as the most reasonable option for its future. He points out that 
“the economics of this are doomed anyway because the Euro was never going to 
work” and consequently draws the conclusions by remarking that “this is serious, we 
need to break the Euro up, we need countries to get their own currencies back” (Video 
15, 2012). According to him, by ignoring the need for action when it comes to the 
future of the Euro, “democracy is actually deliberately and wilfully being destroyed 
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by people who will do anything to prop up their failed and failing Europe” (Video 7, 
2011). Farage is blaming them to only “prop up something that should be allowed to 
die” only because they are “the people with the jobs, they are the people with the big 
salaries and the best pensions payable anywhere in the world” (Video 9, 2012; Video 
15, 2012). Keeping the Euro propped up is “an enforcement of failure” and the 
Spanish call for bailout only shows that already “another bites the dust”, Farage warns 
that Europe is facing a “looming impending disaster”  (Video 19, 2012; Video 21, 
2011). What he does here can be described as a illustrative description of and a 
simplification of highly complex economic and political matters by providing trivial 
reasoning for the proceedings in this respect.  Also, the usual scapegoating helps 
pointing the finger at the ‘political culprits’ by shuffling away the responsibility.   
 
When it comes to the role of the UK within the Eurozone, although they did not join 
the Euro, Farage deplores the top-down politics from the EU, saying that “the City6 is 
being damaged hugely by bureaucratic regulations coming out of Brussels” (Video 
15, 2012). As the only way out of the ‘European misery’, Farage advocates the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU and proposes trade relations and agreements that go beyond 
the European single –market, for the sake of the British traditions and economy (cf. 
Video 17, 2011). Being limited and subdued to the European financial regulations, the 
EU, what Leconte describes, “doom{s} the UK to a parochialism alien to British 
tradition” and reduces it to a mere “province of a European superstate”, so Farage 
suggests that “we leave the EU, we go on doing business with French and German 
companies, but more importantly, we enable ourselves to open up fresh trading links, 
and I think the Commonwealth would be a very good place to start” (2010: 89; Video 
15, 2012). In his view, in order to stimulate UK’s economy and financial situation, 
“we’ve got to refocus Britain towards being part of a global economy and not just 
towards Europe” (Video 19, 2012). It is undeniable that Farage is dissatisfied and 
sceptical about the benefits of the EU for the UK and thus, can be called an 
instrumental Eurosceptic (cf. Lubbers & Scheepers, 2005: 227).  
 
Furthermore, Farage describes the European political elite and their European project 
called Eurozone as pursuing a goal that has failed long ago. For the sake of preserving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The City: The term ‘the City’ is a short-form for the financial district of London. Definition Free 
Merriam- Webster Dictionary.  
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their very own project, this is done at the sacrifice of democracy and the peoples of 
Europe. His reoccurring argument of a lack of democracy is paired with a dire outlook 
on the future, that countries like Greece are imprisoned inside the Eurozone “we are 
going to spark a revolution”, if the EU will continue to be run by “unelected 
bureaucrats” (Video 8, 2012; Video 21, 2011). According to him, “Greece is bust and 
that’s the reality”, “the prime minister of Greece has been removed and replaced by a 
puppet”, so the country needs to regain its democracy (Video 8, 2012). For instance, 
Farage claims that the EU intends “to force upon them austerity measures”, which 
will eventually cause Greece to go bankrupt (Video 8, 2012). As a Eurosceptic, 
Farage intends to avoid giving more decision-making power to ‘the unelected 
bureaucrats’ and their institutions and impeaches the behaviour of the European elites 
and demands their substitution (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 5). His main criticism 
here is the attempted establishment of a “European federalism”, characterised by a 
lack of democracy, referenda and the accountability of its institutions (Video 8, 2012; 
cf. Video 3, 2010, cf. Video 6, 2012).  
 
Eventually, for the long run and in the future, the politician is proposing the 
following: “Let's have a Europe where we sit down together, where we have a free 
trade agreement, where we agree minimum standards on work, on the environment - 
we can do all these things, without a ECM, without a EP and without a ECJ” (Video 
29, 2011). As aforementioned, the only option would then be UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU.  
 
4.5. Against the Political Elite 
 
Going hand in hand with the aforementioned time-honoured procedures of RWPPs, 
Farage avails himself of drastic words influencing his general choice of language, 
such as calling the political EU ‘elite’ a “dislocated society”, which is “hopelessly out 
of touch” (Video 5, 2011). Hereby, a blunt presentation of the in fact existing and 
hardly concealable gap between the European citizens and the EU, mentioned by 
Hooghe, is given and Farage almost bitter-cheerfully rubs the proverbial salt into a 
continuous and frequently criticised wound of the EU institutions (cf. 2003 in de 
Vreese, 2007: 281). A shown in the theoretical section of the thesis, this tactic is 
commonly applied by RWPPs and Farage indeed encapsulates existing negative 
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sentiments among the peoples of Europe against Brussels’ supranational institutions 
by pointing to their alleged lack of vicinage to the citizens and democratic 
legitimisation (cf. Hartleb, 2011: 19-20).  
 
By repeatedly picking up long-term nuisances of the EU, the relationship between the 
European peoples and the political leaders is never moved on the backburner (cf. 
Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 11). The issue of the existing gap, on the all-time-‘to 
combat’-list of the ECM, offers the opportunity for him as a populist politician to 
point out and argue meticulously against the long-known problem, done on the self-
announced behalf of the ‘common people’. This is done by stating that “we live in an 
age when the gap between ordinary voters and the European political class grows 
wider by the day” (Video 29, 2011).  
 
4.6. Targetting Barroso and Van Rompuy 
 
In an attempt to find the responsible ‘architects’ of the European crisis, Farage has 
long ago singled out a whole hoard of, in his eyes, responsible ‘black sheep’. This 
hoard constitutes the leading European political actors, who are ‘falsely’ favouring a 
furthering of the European integration. Mostly, it is van Rompuy and Barroso whom 
he makes his scapegoats and calls them “very bad and very dangerous people”, 
whereby he is appealing to their reason that “the peoples of Europe do not want 
deeper integration” (Video 26 & 27, 2012; Video 4, 2008). He ‘teaches’ Barroso a 
lesson by informing him that “populists are actually democrats” (Video 22, 2011). 
 
Another one of his designations names them as “these ghastly, non-descript people 
running the lives of 500 million people”, who are merely “pursuing their political 
dream of a United States of Europe” (Video 16, 2012; Video 7, 2011). Strategy-wise, 
the straight pointing and raising the moral finger to the personified guilty ones work 
out fairly well in terms of populist success. He is labelling Barroso and van Rompuy 
specifically as “unelected non-entities” and blaming them for the Eurocrisis by 
promulgating “you are causing the misery in these countries” (Video: 17, 2011; Video 
20, 2012). Fearing that “they’re prepared to commit economic suicide for an entire 
continent”, Farage is actively and publicly calling for their resignation, loudly 
proclaiming “I want you all fired!” (Video 16, 2012; Video 29, 2011; cf. Trenz & de 
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Wilde, 2009: 5). His applied tactics can virtually be associated with a prompt for a 
public and political coup d’état in order to overthrow the opposed European elite – an 
invocation for a grassroots revolution so to speak (cf. Trenz & de Wilde, 2009: 5). 
This is essentially important when looking at it as populist strategy. Farage is paying 
attention to the demands of the European public because his ‘constituted hoarding 
power’ is merely following their elitist ideas of a United States of Europe, regardless 
of all the ‘casualties’ along the way. According to him, van Rompuy and Barroso only 
want to further their own idea of the European project, regardless of the consequences 
and costs (cf. Williams, 2010: 115). He positions himself on the side of the people 
and thus, attempts to evade the reputation of being a ‘corrupt’ and ‘greedy’ politician 
as well (cf. Canovan, 1999: 6).  
 
In populist manner, Farage adjusts his speeches in relation to the issue and the current 
political context. The aforementioned questions, whether political actors are reliable 
in keeping their promise and whether they are predictable and consistent in their 
behaviour are intriguing ones in terms of Euroscepticism (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 
257). Their accountability is criticised by Farage as being non-existent and their 
behaviour in terms of the Eurozone-break up as undiscerning and obstinate, 
describing Barroso and van Rompuy as “merely kicking the can down the road”, so 
they are not reliable and consistent in bringing “jobs and growth to Europe” (Video 
25 & 26, 2011; Video 16, 2012). This is going as far as Farage offending van Rompuy 
with cynically saying that “you should perhaps be the pin-up boy of the Eurosceptic 
movement”, portraying him as a personification of everything Euroscepticism 
opposes (Video 1, 2012). It looms large that Farage as a right-wing populist party 
leader takes stance for the peoples of Europe who are exposed to and subjugated to 
the “quiet assassin of European democracy and of the European nation states (Video 
1, 2010). He constantly emphasises that “you {van Rompuy} have not been elected, 
you are not accountable, there is no mechanism for the peoples of Europe to remove 
you, it was Zeus of course that kidnapped Europa, my fear is that you are kidnapping 
our democracy” (Video 13, 2010).  
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4.7. UKIP’s Stances – Farage As The Populist Mouthpiece for 
UKIP?   
 
According to Farage, the peoples of Europe and of “the twenty-seven Member States 
have different interests and do not want to be dominated by unelected bureaucrats in 
the ECM”, so he takes the stance and ‘solidarity’ with them and asserts that UKIP 
will save democracy from the political elites including illegitimate leaders of the 
European institutions  (Video 7, 2011). He claims that “my party will go on 
campaigning that the UK will be free”, but also clarifies that “my party is not anti-
European in any way at all, we want a Europe in which we trade together, cooperate 
together and be good next door neighbours” – however, rejecting a “United States of 
Europe” (Video7, 2011; Video 16, 2012). By pointing out economical, political, 
cultural and linguistic differences between the European countries, UKIP calls for a 
‘friendly co-operation’ rather than an involuntary fusion into a supranational 
institution (cf. Video 7, 2011).   
 
In terms of the immigration debate, Farage states that “four years ago, Cameron 
accused me and my party of closet-racism for talking about the immigration-issue, 
I’m pleased to see that politically he has matured” (Video 5, 2011). Farage and UKIP 
seek to bring the issue of immigration law back into the exclusive hands of domestic 
politics by suggesting “why don’t we in Britain decide ourselves how many people 
are coming in” instead of being subdued to EU laws which allows the total free 
movement of people (Video 5, 2011). The main emphasis is their clear delineation 
from any kind of racism or comparison to the extreme right British National Party and 
explains that the British interests are simply the first priority (cf. UKIP OW, 2011). 
UKIP seconds what Ford describes as the following: “Europe is seen as a foreign 
power, frustrating the will of the British voters and politicians in order to impose alien 
values” (2010). In their agenda, UKIP states two of their main goals as “shutting off 
the flood of immigrants and freeing enterprise” (UKIP, 2011). By saying that 
“goodness me, we have an extra three million people that have settled in this 
overcrowded country of ours since 1997” and “we’ve had a huge number of 
immigrants for these countries” after the Eastern Enlargement of 2004, Farage and 
UKIP confirm a strong argument made by Leconte. With this example, one can see 
that UKIP with their mouthpiece Farage as a Eurosceptic right wing party tends to 
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indeed “project their nationalism and their anti-immigration stance on to the EU” 
(Leconte, 2010: 109). Here, it is noteworthy that it is the EU, who is made the 
scapegoat and thus, according to Farage and UKIP, the responsible one for the ‘mass-
migration’ into the UK, rather than the immigrants themselves. This proves and backs 
up their claimed delineation from extreme right-wing parties and “closet racism” 
(Video 5, 2011).  
 
Farage’s and UKIP’s criticism of mainstream parties is not restricted to domestic 
governing parties, but also and mainly present on EU level. Particularly, fearing the 
threat of a loss of British jobs, UKIP as a typical protest-based party criticises the 
mainstream national government cutting down expenses for Britain, but at the same 
time increasing the money spent on the EU (cf. Barnett, 2010).  As the chosen videos 
have shown, Farage, on behalf of UKIP, is constantly denouncing and degrading the 
current domestic and European political mainstream stage, who are allegedly ignoring 
the interests of the British people (cf. Video 7, 2011). Since he is constantly 
demanding a British referendum concerning the EU membership, the question of his 
potential intentions inevitably emerges. UKIP argues that the EU is merely “a 
symptom, not the cause” and simply “undemocratic, expensive, bossy – and we still 
haven’t been asked whether we want to be in it” (UKIP OW, 2011). The idea 
immediately suggests itself that he speculates on the theory that the more citizens 
disagree with their national governments and domestic institutions, the more they tend 
to be reluctant to support EU integration (cf. Krouwel & Abts, 2007: 253 & cf. 
McLaren, 2002, 2005). So he and UKIP must be convinced that, were the British 
public given a referendum, they would vote against a EU membership. This is an 
emerging question, which unfortunately, for space reason, cannot be examined in this 
thesis. It would be worth scrutinising why Farage is so convinced about a -for him- 
positive outcome from a British referendum and whether this is related to the ECM 
Eurobarometer results from the UK. Herein, it has been found that “56 per cent of UK 
citizens said they did not understand how the EU worked” and “64 per cent of the poll 
said they did not trust the EU” (ECM: Eurobarometer, 2010: 3; 6). It would be 
intriguing to see if Farage speculates on the citizen’s insecurities, deriving from a lack 
of substantial EU knowledge and trust, which would result in a vote against their 
country’s membership. Would this favour UKIP’s agenda of the British withdrawal? 
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If this was actually true, his populist tactics of denouncing the domestic governing 
parties as well as the whole range of EU institutions in order to achieve Britain’s EU 
withdrawal could prove successful. However, the question remains if the EU as the 
black sheep is actually justified or whether it is merely being used to find a trigger to 
express political discontent within the own country. UKIP blames the EU for being 
“the biggest symptom of the real problem” – and contends with now well-known 
arguments that the people need to combat “the theft of our democracy by a powerful, 
remote political ‘elite’ which has forgotten that it’s here to serve the people” (UKIP 
OW, 2011).  
 
It has been found that in terms of success, “his remarks have had the desired effect” 
(Spiegel, 2012). Farage can be sure to evoke not only attention among his audience, 
but also potentially new supportive voters for UKIP. On domestic soil, the UKIP did 
well in recent local elections in England and prominent Tories have defected to his 
party. In the polls, UKIP is just behind the Liberal Democrats who are part of 
Britain's coalition government. As a result, Farage is becoming an increasing problem 
for Prime Minister David Cameron's Conservatives (cf. Spiegel, 2012). The politician 
aims at advancing “liberty, freedom and democracy” and heralds that “we’ve got to 
fight back against these people who seem to want to entrap us in a formal global 
government” (Video 8, 2012). On a more negative scale though, he is described as a 
“politician, who is resorting to cheap populism in order to rack up domestic political 
points” for his party (Spiegel, 2012).  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
With the results of the word counting in all videos, a justification for my choice of 
categories has been given, substantiating the validity to draw generalisations from 
them. After examining these five categories in detail, they have been proven to be in 
fact populist rhetoric tools and serve their purpose well, of bringing Farage’s 
Eurosceptic message across. The use of these populist rhetoric tools helps him making 
his Euroseptic voice heard, not only in the EP, but also in the UK and across Europe. 
As his main targets of criticism, the EU institutions, along with the ‘Bully-boys’ 
Barroso and van Rompuy have been singled out as the lone representatives of the 
threat to British national sovereignty. Linking contextually quite relevant issues to 
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mere superficial solutions like ‘firing’ representatives of the EP or simply leaving the 
Union, undermine his credibility in terms of offering valid solutions. The analysis has 
shown that UKIP’s agenda of preserving British interests can very well be justified, 
however, it is barely laid out in detail how it is supposed to happen. Farage’s string of 
arguments gives the impression that certain worldly occurrences, such as globalisation 
and the world’s political developments, are unswayable and mostly out of our control. 
Yet, a decision about the EU and a membership in it, is something that is indeed in 
our hands and thus, susceptible to change, triggering the desire of Farage and UKIP to 
aim for it.  
 
With his populist strategy and reckless provocative populist rhetoric, Farage is said to 
actually be badmouthing and dramatising the current situation and “thereby 
worsening the crisis” (Spiegel, 2012). Given the assumption that his political goal, the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU, was to happen one day, what would be the 
consequence? He would lose his job as an MEP and his UKIP their main agenda. It 
would be interesting to see the influence on the number of UKIP votes on national 
level, resulting in an uncertain future for the party, whose sustainability would be 
doubtful anyway, once the blame has to be found on national soil. It is surprising 
enough that I could not find any journalist in all twenty-nine videos that would 
actually ask questions about UKIP’s future, after their current agenda would have 
been fulfilled. 
 
When furthering the study of Farage, there is a great variety of aspects that would be 
highly intriguing and worth taking a look at. For instance, an examination of the tone 
of his voice, the irony and cynicism that colours his speeches and influences his tone, 
would be extremely worthwhile. Furthermore, adopting a research angle other than a 
political one, could offer insightful perspectives into the matter. His role as a 
charismatic, populist leader in particular, would allow for some enlightening findings, 
for instance from the perspective of English Romanticism. Additionally, a comparison 
and juxtaposition of various European populist right-wing politicians, along with their 
differences and similarities in rhetoric and topics discussed, would be late-breaking 
and highly relevant. All in all, these considerations of Farage as a politician and his 
populist rhetoric tools could be particularly significant when attempting to evaluate 
and measure his political success, in the last decades as well as in the future.  
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Moreover, one could argue that the withdrawal from the EU and the reduction of the 
UK’s relation to merely trade agreements, would be seizing EU’s advantages without 
taking responsibility. In turn, this reminds of the times of British colonialism, in 
which the UK was profiting from the Commonwealth countries, but was not showing 
solidarity when it came to their wealth and rights.  
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